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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
this matter is pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-
2(3) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Defendant Chadaz has stated several issues for 
review, many of which are not in the Memorandum Decision 
issued by the Court as a final order on the Summary 
Judgment, which decision is in the record from page 327 -
331 and dated October 21, 1997. The Court would be 
benefitted by reading that Memorandum Decision which is 
attached as Addendum "F" to Defendant Chadaz7s brief. 
Issue number 3 in Defendant's brief that the Trial 
Court should have made additional findings in accordance 
with rule 52 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
satisfied when the Court issued the Memorandum Decision 
dated October 21, 1997, Addendum "F" . This decision was 
issued in direct response to Chadaz's Rule 52(a) motion 
and objections. Therefore, Rule 52(a) is satisfied by 
the October 21, 1997, decision. 
Next, Defendant Chadaz lists as an issue whether 
there were material facts as to whether or not an 
easement existed over the property owned by Potters. The 
Trial Court in large measure dealt solely with the law 
and held as a matter of law that Defendant Chadaz did not 
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have an easement, citing Chadaz's failure to reserve an 
easement to herself when she first made the conveyance, 
and now that Chadaz was a stranger to the deed, Heritage 
Park Plaza, Inc. could not reserve to Chadaz something 
that Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. did not own. The Trial 
Court Order relied upon the traditional rule and the Utah 
precedent in Johnson v. Peck 63 P.2d 251 (Utah 1936), 
which Defendant Chadaz has failed to cite in her brief, 
and the case of Thomson v. Wade, 69 N.Y.2d 570; 516 
N.Y.S.2d 614; 509 N.E.2d 309 (N.Y. 1987) , the law in New 
York, which Utah follows. 
The Court also ruled as a matter of law, that the 
consideration in the contract or deed containing the 
easement was the purchase of property to build a road, 
which purchase was never consummated, nor was 
construction on the anticipated subdivision ever 
commenced. The roadway was not completed as required in 
the contract by October 1, 1981 and the failure to 
complete the roadway at that time, vitiated any 
agreement, claim or right with respect to the same. The 
Court held the consideration entirely failed, the 
conditions precedent failed, and concluded that the 
intended use or purpose of the easement was therefore 
frustrated and if any easement ever did exist, the same 
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was nullified. The Trial Court found that Defendant's 
rights, if any, were similar to a third party beneficiary 
to a failed contract. Defendant's cause of action, in 
that case, is not for specific performance against Potter 
who is a stranger to the agreement, but for damages, if 
any, against one of the parties to the failed agreement 
such as Heritage Park Partners. Defendant Chadaz has 
failed to address this issue in her Appellant Brief. 
Plaintiff Potter specifically states that the 
Memorandum Decision issued October 21, 1997 adequately 
sets forth the reasons why the Court as a matter of law 
granted the Summary Judgment and why, based on the facts 
before it, there are no genuine issues of material fact 
to prevent Summary Judgment in Plaintiff's favor. See 
the record 32 7 - 331 and Addendum f,Ffl to the Defendant's 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs Potter (hereafter "Potter") filed a Quiet 
Title Action on their land. Chadaz claimed an easement 
on the east 66 feet. Potter filed for summary judgment 
and after a hearing the Court grated the summary judgment 
denying any easement. 
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Potter requests that the Appellate Court uphold the 
Trial Court judgement, that Defendant Chadaz conveyed all 
of her property away and failed to make the reservation 
of an easement. Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not 
reserve to Chadaz something that Chadaz no longer owned. 
Chadaz attempted to correct this problem, but the attempt 
was inadequate since she no longer was in privity of 
contract with Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. and Villatek, 
Inc. Chadaz's late attempt to purchase the easement 
using a Quit Claim Deed after Potter had already 
purchased his property was of no effect. Potter had 
become a bona fide purchaser and the Quit Claim deed was 
conveyed to Chadaz by a defunct corporation that had no 
rights to convey. If Chadaz wanted the easement, she 
should have requested that it be conveyed to her directly 
by either Villatek or by Heritage Park Plaza in a deed of 
conveyance in 1980. 
In addition, Defendant Chadaz is further barred by 
the law regarding bona fide purchasers, failure of 
consideration and purpose envisioned in the contracts, 
failure of conditions precedent and subsequent, 
abandonment or termination and estoppel. 
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B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On May 12, 1980, Floyd and Reta Chadaz, the 
Defendant herein (hereafter "Chadaz"), owned 
approximately 47.12 acres, which land they agreed to sell 
on contract to Heritage Park Partners. (See Chadaz's 
Addendum "A", R. Vol I, Page 124-136). 
2. The Legal title was transferred by Chadaz to 
Hi 11am Abstracting by Warranty Deed on May 12, 1980, 
without reserving or retaining a right-of-way to their 
property. (See Potter's Addendum #1, R. Vol I, Page 
137) . 
3. Hi11am Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc., 
Trustee, (as agent for Chadaz) conveyed approximately 
1.58 acres to Heritage Park Partners outright by Warranty 
Deed dated May 12, 1980. (See Potter's Addendum #2, R. 
Vol I, Page 138). This Warranty Deed did not reserve a 
right-of-way to Chadaz. 
4. On October 24, 1980 Heritage Park Partners 
transferred the 1.58 acres to Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. 
(This warranty deed did not reserve any right-of-way) . 
(See Chadaz's Addendum "C", R. Vol. II, Page 261). 
5. On or about October 24, 1980 (note this is prior 
to the November 25, 1980 Supplemental Agreement, Chadaz's 
Addendum !IBn) , Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. transferred the 
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1.58 acres to Villatek, Inc. (a stranger to the original 
sale between Chadaz and Heritage Park Partners) by 
Special Warranty Deed which was recorded December 9, 
1980. (See Chadaz's Addendum "D". R. Vol I, Page 146). 
This conveyance purported to reserve a right-of-way for 
Chadaz, who was a third party stranger to that deed, and 
contained the language "subject to a right-of-way over 
the East 66 feet of said property, for the purpose of a 
proposed road." This roadway was to be completed before 
October 1, 1981 according to the Supplemental Agreement 
marked as Chadaz's Addendum "B" R. 139 - 145. Note, the 
easement did not benefit either Villatek or Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc., but only Chadaz or Hi11am Abstract. 
6. The consideration for the transfer from Heritage 
Park Plaza, Inc. to Villatek, Inc. mentioned above is 
found in an unrecorded Agreement dated November 14, 1980 
between those two parties which stated: "Whereas, said 
Purchasers have agreed that in order to induce said 
vendors to sell subject property for an amount which has 
been determined and agreed upon by both parties herein, 
they will assume certain responsibilities in connection 
with said property." Those responsibilities were: 
"Purchasers agree[d] to develop a road over the East 66 
feet of subject property, which road shall be approved by 
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the City of Tremonton, prior to development, and 
dedicated to same City of Tremonton, following completion 
of development, said development to commence on or before 
June 1, 1981." (See Potter's Addendum # 3 , R. Vol I, 
Page 102) . Thus, the right-of-way was absolutely 
contingent upon Villatek, Inc. commencing development 
before June 1, 1981 and completing development of the 
roadway prior to October 1, 1981 and dedicating the 
roadway to the City of Tremonton upon completion. 
7. On November 25, 198 0, Chadaz entered into a 
Supplemental Agreement with Heritage Park Partners and 
Triple S Development, Inc, wherein one of the conditions 
of the Supplemental Agreement was that Heritage Park 
Partners agreed that when the 1.58 acres was further sold 
or conveyed to a third party, that there would be a 
reservation of a 66 foot wide roadway from Main Street to 
the Seller's (Chadaz) remaining property. This provision 
in paragraph 4 of said Agreement stated: "It being 
specifically provided that this roadway will be complete 
with curb, gutter, sidewalks, sewer, and pavement, and 
shall be completed prior to October 1, 1981." 
Consequently, the reservation for a roadway was 
contingent upon Buyer completing that roadway before 
October 1, 1981. Completion of the roadway became part 
8 
of the consideration for purchase of said property. (See 
Chadaz's Addendum "B", R. Vol I, Page 107). 
8 . The November 24, 19 80 Supplemental Agreement was 
not recorded. Note also that Heritage Park Partners had 
already sold the 1.58 acres to Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. 
before this Supplemental Agreement was signed. 
9. Villatek, Inc. defaulted in its Agreement and 
never began construction of the roadway and then 
transferred the property to Bradley J. Jorgensen on 
February 25, 1982, which was after the completion date of 
the roadway without mentioning the roadway or right-of-
way. This was transferred by Warranty Deed with no 
mention of the right-of-way. (See Potter's Addendum #4, 
R. Vol I, Page 169) . Heritage Park Partners and Heritage 
Park Plaza both defaulted and Hillam Abstract returned 
the property back to Chadaz, R. Vol I, Page 8 5 paragraph 
11) . 
10. Subsequently, Bradley J. Jorgensen was 
foreclosed upon pursuant to power of sale and his 
property was transferred by the Trustee to Golden Spike 
State Bank with no mention of the right-of-way or any 
roadway. (See Potter's Addendum #5, R. Vol I, Pages 171 
- 173) . 
9 
11. Golden Spike Bank then went into foreclosure and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation liquidated the 
property and sold the property by Quit Claim Deed to 
James Holmgren without mentioning any right-of-way. (See 
Potter's Addendum #6, R. Vol I, Page 174). 
12 . James Holmgren then transferred the property to 
Gary Bywater by Warranty Deed without any mention of the 
right-of-way or any roadway. Bywater's purchased the 
land, and the title insurance policy gave no notice of 
any recorded right-of-way. (See Potter's Addendum # 7# R. 
Vol I, Page 176). 
13. On July 23, 1993, Gary Bywater subsequently 
transferred part of the property to Potter, the Plaintiff 
herein, by Warranty Deed without mentioning any right-of-
way. This conveyance severed the property from the 
Chadaz property so it no longer abutted Chadaz's 
property. (See Potter's Addendum # 8 , R. Vol I, Page 
177) . 
14. Potters also had a title search which did not 
reveal any recorded easements except pole line, drainage 
and ditch easements, one of which was to Floyd Chadaz. 
(See Potter's Addendum # 9, R. Vol I, Pages 8 - 12). 
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15. Accordingly, every transfer of the property 
since Villatek, Inc. owned the property was made with no 
mention of an easement or right-of-way. 
16. The Subject property has never been used for an 
easement. A large ditch crosses the property preventing 
any traffic from crossing said ditch, and the embankment 
from main street dropped off sharply. The 66 foot right-
of-way that is asserted by Chadaz has never been in 
existence or used by any party. (See Affidavit of 
Potters marked as Addendum # 10, R. Vol I, Pages 165-
168) . 
17. Potters, to assure themselves that it was safe 
to build on this property, called Chadaz prior to 
building on the property and asked specifically if she 
had any objections to him building or constructing across 
said property that she make those objections known to the 
City of Tremonton at a zoning meeting. Chadaz's response 
was that it would make no difference. (See Zoning 
Meeting Minutes attached as Potter's Addendum # 11, R. 
Vol I, Page 166 and Vol I, Page 155 - 159). 
18 . Potters then proceeded to build on the property. 
They filled the property with several tons of gravel, 
building the property up so one could enter the property 
from Main street. Prior to that, where Chadaz claims 
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this right-of-way allegedly existed, one could not enter 
from the street. There was no visible evidence on the 
land in 1993 or now that an easement had ever existed, 
(See Potter's Addendum #10, R. Vol I, Pages 165 - 168). 
19. Chadaz has access to her property from several 
different locations, including from 100 South directly 
off of Main Street, 200 South, 400 South and 600 South. 
(See Potter's Addendum #12, R. Vol I, Page 154, attached 
showing the roads that are available to the Defendant to 
reach her property without crossing over Dean Potter's 
property and Gary Bywater's property.) From this Exhibit 
it can be noticed that the Bywater property separates the 
Potter property from the Chadaz property. Therefore, the 
Chadaz property no longer abuts the Potter property. 
20. Chadaz never claimed a right-of-way until 1995, 
two years after Potters' purchase on July 23, 1993 and 
after all improvements were made. (See Potters 
Affidavit, Addendum #10 paragraphs 5 and 6, R. Vol I, 
Pages 165 - 168 and Maurice Staples Affidavit, Potter's 
Addendum # 13, R. 99 - 100). 
21. Chadaz, after Potters denied her easement on 
May 2, 1996, attempted to obtain the easement by Quit 
Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (See Potter's 
Addendum # 14, R. Vol I, Page 148). This occurred only 
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because Potters had refused to permit Chadaz any easement 
claim. Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was a defunct 
Corporation as of October, 1983. (See Potter's Addendum 
#15) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Potter's argument, which follows current Utah law, 
is that Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not create or 
reserve an easement to Chadaz when it transferred the 
property to Villatek, Inc. The majority of 
jurisdictions, including Utah, follow the traditional 
rule which states that one is not permitted to reserve an 
easement to a third person, who does not own the 
property, while conveying property to another. The logic 
behind the rule is that one cannot reserve something for 
another which that person does not own or have rights to. 
This also creates certainty in title and protects bona 
fide purchasers. Since Chadaz had conveyed away all of 
her property and did not retain any of her property, 
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not reserve an easement 
in favor of Chadaz. Chadaz no longer had any rights to 
the property and no easement could vest in Chadaz. 
Likewise, Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not create an 
easement in land that it did not own. Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. did not yet own the other acreage which was 
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still held by Hi11am Abstract. For those reasons, the 
attempted reservation failed and would not be noticed by 
subsequent purchasers of the existence of an easement. 
In addition, the Trial Court found that the purpose 
for the easement and the consideration for the easement 
both failed. The easement was to be constructed for the 
development of a proposed subdivision. Villatek, Inc. 
was supposed to build the easement or roadway, and in 
exchange would receive, in part payment, the 1.58 acres. 
However, Villatek failed to build the road and Heritage 
Park Plaza, Inc. failed to develop the subdivision. Both 
the purpose for the road (i.e. the subdivision) and the 
consideration for the property (i.e. the roadway) failed 
and the purpose for the easement was frustrated. 
Villatek, Inc. transferred the property to a subsequent 
purchaser without reserving or mentioning the easement. 
Chadaz apparently foreclosed on Heritage Park Partners on 
the balance of land and Hi11am Abstract transferred the 
property back to Chadaz by Warranty Deed without 
mentioning any right-of-way. The other 1.58 acres was 
foreclosed upon by federal banks and transferred to 
subsequent purchasers without any mention of the 
easement. Nearly thirteen (13) years later, Potter 
purchased the property through a Warranty Deed without 
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any mention of the easement. The title search did not 
reveal any recorded easement. All of Mr. Potter's 
inquiries, even to the Defendant Chadaz, revealed no 
easement across the property. Plaintiff Potter proceeded 
to purchase and build on the property. 
The Trial Court found under contract law and the 
facts as listed above, that the purpose for the easement 
failed, that any conditions precedent or subsequent 
failed and that any consideration for the easement 
terminated. The parties who were initially a part of 
this subdivision also recognized the failure of the 
easement because they also failed to transfer the 
easement to any subsequent purchasers or even to the 
Defendant Chadaz herself. 
For the above reasons and others, Potters were bona 
fide purchasers of the land without actual or 
constructive knowledge of any easement. Even if Chadaz 
could argue that Potter should have been on notice that 
there used to be a claim of right-of-way in 1980 across 
his property, the above facts and case law show that the 
easement never came into existence. Potter also 
conducted a diligent inquiry regarding the property and 
learned to his satisfaction that no one was claiming an 
easement across the property and proceeded to purchase 
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and build on the property. It was not until after he 
built on the property that Chadaz complained. 
For the same reasons as stated above the Court also 
concluded that the parties merely attempted to create an 
easement and the creation never succeeded. The property 
was never used for a roadway or easement prior to 1980 or 
after 1980. There were ditches and large embankments 
throughout the property which prevented effective use of 
that property for the purpose of the alleged easement. 
There has never been a subdivision plat filed with the 
city of Tremonton showing the proposed road or easement. 
The property has never been developed as a subdivision. 
The City7 s master plan does not show the proposed road as 
an extension of its plan. The property has been used as 
farm land from 1980 until the present. The construction 
of any roadway was abandoned by Villatek in 1980. 
Potter's property has now been severed from Chadaz's 
property and no longer abuts Potter's property. The 
Defendant Bywaters' own property that is located between 
Plaintiff s property and Defendant' s property. Defendant 
Chadaz has taken action inconsistent with any claim of an 
easement across said property and should not be allowed 
to attempt to revive this old purposed road which was 
abandoned long ago. 
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Defendant Chadaz has several other access roads to 
her property. The other entrances allow access similar 
to the claimed access road that she desires. Her 
property can still be used for the purposes which she 
claims. However, if the easement is allowed across 
Potter's land he cannot use his property as contemplated. 
The burdens to Potter far outweigh any evidence that an 
easement ever existed. 
Chadaz claims she needs a hearing over whether there 
was an abandonment or an estoppel. However, the Court 
considered the purpose for the easement in the contracts 
and found the purpose was abandoned, foreclosed upon and 
terminated. The parties agreed and stipulated that the 
development had been abandoned, the roadway was never 
built, and that the property had been foreclosed upon. 
Heritage Park Partners, through Hillam Abstract, when it 
turned property back to Chadaz, never mentioned any 
easement to Chadaz. The Court interpreted this evidence 
as a clear and distinct abandonment of the easement. The 
Court found that the easement terminated by its own terms 
because it was never built or dedicated to the City of 
Tremonton by October 1, 1981 as required. When this 
subdivision was abandoned, the easement was abandoned 
with it. 
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The Court also found that the evidence was clear 
that Chadaz never complained or asserted her right to the 
easement until after Potter had built upon the property. 
The Court considered Chadaz friend's affidavit and found 
that Potter's Affidavit in rebuttal to it showed the true 
facts on when Chadaz first complained or asserted her 
right to the easement. On that issue there were no 
material issues of fact in dispute. As a result the 
Court ruled that Chadaz was estopped from trying to 
reassert this easement, particularly when she had several 
other access roads to her property, all of which were 
equally suitable to Chadaz's purposes. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH FOLLOWS THE TRADITIONAL RULE WHICH STATES 
THAT ONE CANNOT RESERVE AN EASEMENT IN A THIRD 
PERSON WHILE CONVEYING PROPERTY TO ANOTHER. 
(a) Chadaz failed to reserve the easement 
before she transferred the property to 
Heritage Park Partners and Heritage 
Park Plaza cannot reserve it for 
Chadaz. 
The traditional rule, still valid in the majority of 
jurisdictions including Utah, states that one is not 
permitted to reserve an easement to a third person while 
conveying property to another. See Johnson v. Peek, 63 
P.2d 251 (Utah 1936), (a case which involved a deed 
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containing a recital that the conveyance was subject to 
a right-of-way for the benefit of adjoining land). In 
Johnson v. Peck, the grantor had previously conveyed the 
adjoining land by a deed and no longer owned the land, 
just as Chadaz did in this case. The Utah Court stated 
on page 254 the following: 
"The language of the recital in question is 
'subject to a right of way ... for the use and 
benefit of the land adjoining said ground on 
the west. . . .' This clearly is not the vesting 
of any newly created right in the grantor Baird 
Realty Investment Company. That company had no 
right or interest in the land to the west, 
having conveyed it away some two years before. 
The recital in the deed could not vest any 
right of easement in a stranger to the deed, 
(citation to New York Law) . " (Emphasis added) 
In the present case, Chadaz conveyed away all of her 
rights to the 47.12 acres and the 1.58 acres to Heritage 
Park Partners without reservation or exception for a 
right-of-way. Heritage Park Partners also conveyed away 
the 1.58 acres to Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. without 
reservation or exception for a right-of-way. When 
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. conveyed the property to 
Villatek, Inc. it attempted to reserve a right-of-way 
across the 1.58 acres for the benefit of a third party, 
i.e, Chadaz, who no longer owned the property. Because 
Chadaz is now a stranger to the deed and not in privity 
of contract or conveyance with Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. 
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and Villatek, Inc., the attempted reservation cannot 
create a valid interest in favor of Chadaz. 
UTAH FOLLOWS NEW YORK LAW ON THIS ISSUE. 
In a New York case, which is on point, with facts 
almost identical to those in the case at bar, the court 
found that Plaintiff did not have a right-of-way over 
Defendants' land for the benefit of his property. See In 
the Matter of the Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 69 N.Y.2d 
570; 516 N.Y.S.2d 614; 509 N.E.2d 309 (New York 1987), 
where Plaintiff and Defendant owned adjoining parcels of 
land near the St. Lawrence River. Plaintiff's property 
had a motel built on it and fronts on the river. 
Defendant's unimproved parcel was between Plaintiff's 
land and a public road. Both parcels were previously 
owned by Edward John Noble, who in 1945, separately 
conveyed them to Defendant's predecessor and Plaintiff's 
predecessor. Although Noble had always used Defendant's 
parcel to gain access to the public road from the motel 
property, in transferring the motel property to 
Plaintiffs, he did not reserve an express easement 
appurtenant over Defendant's parcel for the benefit of 
the motel property. When Noble subsequently conveyed the 
unimproved parcel to Defendants, he attempted to reserve 
to himself personally and to Plaintiff a right-of-way 
20 
across Defendant's parcel to the public road. Sometime 
later, the Plaintiff acquired from the Noble Foundation 
a quit claim deed to the right-of-way over Defendant's 
property that Noble had tried to reserve for himself and 
Plaintiffs. The Court ruled that Noble could not reserve 
a right-of-way to land he did not own. The Court 
reasoned in Wade at page 310: 
"It is axiomatic that Noble could not create an 
easement benefiting land which he did not own 
(see, 3 Powell, Real Property, easements by 
express conveyance paragraph, 4 07) . Thus, 
having already conveyed the annexed parcel, he 
could not 'reserve' in the deed to defendant's 
predecessor in interest an easement appurtenant 
to the annexed parcel for the benefit of 
plaintiff's predecessor in interest. A long 
accepted rule in this state holds that a deed 
with a reservation or exception by the grantor 
in favor of a third party, a so called 
' stranger to the deed' , does not create a valid 
interest in favor of that third party." 
The Court indicated the policy reasons for following the 
general rule as follows: 
"Although application of the 'stranger to the 
deed' rule may, at times, frustrate a grantor's 
intent, any such frustration can readily be 
avoided by the direct conveyance of an easement 
of record from the grantor to the third party. 
The overriding considerations of the 'public 
policy favoring certainty in title to real 
property, both to protect bona fide purchasers 
and to avoid conflicts of ownership, which may 
engender needless litigation' persuade us to 
decline to depart from our settled rule. We 
have previously noted that in this area of law, 
'where it can reasonably be assumed that 
settled rules are necessary and necessarily 
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relied upon, stability and adherence to 
precedent are generally more important than a 
better or even a "correct" rule of law' . 
Consequently, we hold here that any right of 
way reserved to plaintiff's predecessor in 
interest in the defendant's deed was 
ineffective to create an express easement in 
plaintiff's favor." Id at 310. 
The court went on to discuss the fact that when Plaintiff 
attempted to obtain the right-of-way by a quit claim deed 
from Noble, the original grantor, it was of no benefit 
and stated as follows: 
"Additionally, inasmuch as the right of way 
reserved to Noble personally was not shown to 
be commercial in nature, the appellate division 
correctly determined that it could not be 
transferred to plaintiff in the quit claim deed 
by the Noble foundation. Thus, neither the 
reservation of an easement in gross in Noble, 
nor the reservation of a right of way in 
plaintiff's predecessor in interest, entitles 
plaintiff to an express easement across 
defendant's property." Id at 310. 
The above case is directly on point and entitles Mr. 
and Mrs. Potter to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah Law follows New York Law as previously shown in the 
case of Johnson v. Peck, Id. 
Accordingly, Chadaz cannot claim any benefit to the 
right-of-way since she was both a stranger to the deed 
and did not own the 47.12 acres at the time for it was 
legally titled and owned by Hi11am Abstract for Heritage 
Park Partners. Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.'s attempted 
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reservation of a right-of-way for Chadaz, the third 
party, was void. Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not 
reserve to Chadaz something that neither Chadaz nor 
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. owned; they had no benefitted 
property. Chadaz' failure to seek a direct conveyance of 
the right-of-way when she first transferred the property 
to Heritage Park Partners was fatal and could not be 
corrected by having Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. make the 
reservation for her. Chadaz's attempt to obtain the 
easement by Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, 
Inc. after Potters already had purchased the property was 
too late. 
REBUTTAL TO CHADAZ CLAIMS. 
Chadaz consistently ignores the reality that 
according to Utah case law an easement cannot be reserved 
in favor of a third party, who is a "stranger to the 
deed". Johnson v. Peck, 63 P.2d 251 (Utah 1936) . Chadaz 
instead chooses to pretend that the case law of 
California or Alaska should govern, where neither of 
those states are controlling. Chadaz further tries to 
muddle the issue, by claiming that the facts in this case 
are controlled by principles of contract law and that the 
Court should look at the agreements instead of the well-
settled principles of property law that clearly govern 
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the conveyance of real property and the recording of real 
estates instruments. Chadaz's attempt to focus on 
contract law is merely a red herring that has no 
relevance to the disposition of this case. 
For instance, it is irrelevant what sort of 
agreement Chadaz entered into with Heritage Park 
Partners, or other circumstances that surround the 
conveyance of the property in question, when those 
agreements were not recorded in the real estate records 
for bona fide purchasers to review. What is relevant on 
this Appeal is that on May 12, 1980, Chadaz conveyed by 
Warranty Deed, which was duly recorded, 47.12 acres to 
Hi11am Abstract, Inc., without reserving an easement to 
herself. Likewise it is relevant that on May 12, 1980 
Hi11am Abstract, Inc., conveyed by Warranty Deed, which 
was duly recorded, 1.58 acres of the 47.12 acres to 
Heritage Park Partners, again failing to reserve an 
easement. (See Potter's Addendum # 2 , R. Vol I, Page 
138). It is not relevant that this conveyance was part 
of larger transaction between Chadaz and Heritage Park 
Partners because Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (allegedly the 
successor or same entity as Heritage Park Partners), 
never made an agreement with Chadaz to reserve an 
easement in favor of Chadaz. What is truly relevant is 
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that Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. attempted to reserve an 
easement in the Special Warranty Deed to Villatek, Inc. 
to a stranger to the deed, i.e., Chadaz, which action is 
ineffective to create an easement under Utah law. 
Chadaz, by erroneously relying upon contractual 
relationships that existed between herself and Heritage 
Park Partners (not Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.) wrongfully 
suggests that these contractual duties or obligations 
somehow altered or suspended the effect of property law 
upon the conveyances of real property that took place. 
If Chadaz wants relief from the unsatisfactory results of 
those contractual relationship, she should have brought 
suit against those parties who were in privity with the 
contract. As the trial court justifiably held: 
"The Defendant (Chadaz) essentially claims a 
right as third party beneficiary to a failed 
contract. That is not an enforceable right 
against a non-party. In such cases, the 
Defendant's relief is not for a specific 
performance against a stranger to the 
agreement, but for damages, if any, as against 
one of the parties." Courts Memorandum 
Decision Addendum F, Record 330. 
Chadaz also attempts to explain in some detail that 
Heritage Park Partners and Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. were 
the same entity. This explanation may be worthy for one 
litigating a corporate debt claim arising under the law 
of corporations, however, the only fact relevant to this 
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discussion is that on October 24, 1980, Heritage Park 
Partners conveyed by Warranty Deed, which was duly 
recorded, 1.58 acres to Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., 
without reserving any easement. (See Chadaz's Addendum 
"C", R. Vol I, Pages 261 - 262). Chadaz fails to 
recognize that her agreement was only with Heritage Park 
Partners and Triple S. Development, not Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. (See Chadaz's Addendums "A" and "B", R. Vol 
I, Pages 124 - 136 and Pages 139 - 145) . Chadaz ignores 
the fact that Heritage Park Partners is a partnership, 
while Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. is a corporation that 
become defunct October 1983. Heritage Park Partners had 
two or three partners, while Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. 
apparently had several other shareholders. 
Chadaz next unsuccessfully attempts to explain why 
this Court should find that Chadaz retained an interest 
in the real estate and is somehow not a stranger to the 
deed back in 1980. Chadaz admits in her argument on page 
2 6 of her brief that she did convey the land burdened by 
the easement, but then wrongfully misstates the facts 
when she quotes that she never conveyed the land 
benefitted by the easement due to the default of the 
buyers. To come to that conclusion, Chadaz would have to 
totally ignore her complete conveyance of property to 
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Hillam Abstracting of all 47.12 acres. An analysis of 
Chadaz's argument reveals that the transaction that 
occurred between Chadaz and Heritage Park Partners was a 
conditional sale using a trustee as an intermediary. 
Chadaz could have chosen a mortgage sale, trust deed 
sale, or installment sale, but chose to use the 
conditional sale substitute, where the seller conveys all 
title to the real estate to a trustee under a land sale 
contract and the buyer takes possession of the property 
as if it were his own and begins to make payments to the 
seller for the land. This device has historically been 
used to avoid usuary laws and to avoid the buyers equity 
of redemption upon the buyers default, as generally 
required by both mortgage and trust deed law. The land 
sale contract generally provides that if the buyer 
defaults that he must reconvey the land back to the 
seller and forfeit all payments previously made to the 
seller. It is important to note under these contracts 
that the seller's remedy is provided wholly by the 
contract and that Seller transfers title away. 
What Chadaz could not explain is why, if the 
contract failed and the buyers were in default, all of 
the buyer's obligations, including the right to reserve 
an easement for Chadaz would have likewise failed and 
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disappeared. Chadaz further fails to explain why she did 
not seek a direct conveyance of an easement across the 
1.58 acres from the owner of the 1.58 acres. If she 
truly wanted to reserve or maintain an easement across 
that land, she should have acquired a deed directly from 
Villatek, who was the owner of the 1.58 acres. However, 
the facts show that upon default by the buyers that 
Chadaz merely received part of her property back from 
Hillam Abstracting, Inc. by a warranty deed without 
reference to any reservation of an easement. In spite of 
all of Defendant Chadaz' labored argumentation, from that 
first conveyance to Hillam Abstract forward, Chadaz 
became a stranger to the subsequent deeds, and Utah law 
does not allow others to reserve an easement for her 
since Chadaz is no longer the legal title owner of 
record. When Potters reviewed the records, the only 
evidence before them as bona fide purchases at that time, 
was that Chadaz was a stranger to the deeds when the 
easement was attempted to be reserved for her and as a 
result the easement failed under traditional Utah law. 
Chadaz attempts to discredit both Utah and New York 
law by stating that this Court should follow California 
law or the law in Alaska. However, the rational and 
strength for following the traditional rule is based upon 
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certainty of recorded property law. The Court in Wade 
identified the strength of this position when it stated: 
"We have previously noted that in this area of 
law, where it can be reasonably be assumed that 
sale of rules are necessary and necessarily 
relied upon, stability and adherence to 
precedent are generally more important than a 
better or even a 'correct' rule of law." Id. 
at page 310. 
The second rational for maintaining the traditional rule 
is also intertwined with the first. A grantor may easily 
convey an easement to a third party without any 
difficulty. The method for doing such is by merely 
signing a deed of conveyance, conveying an easement 
directly to that third party. This method has several 
advantages: 1. The easement appears as a recorded deed 
instead of a reservation in the real estate records 
improving the quality of the notice given to all 
subsequent purchasers. 2. The stability and certainty 
in the law is maintained. 3. The purpose and intent of 
the grantor is clearly identified and given full effect. 
Consequently, the traditional rule regarding strangers to 
deed, satisfies both its critics and its proponents. 
In any event, Potters at the time they purchased the 
property relied upon prior Utah precedent under Johnson 
v. Peckf which was the governing and ruling law at that 
time, and purchased the property free and clear of the 
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easement. Defendant Chadaz cannot claim that this Court 
should now retroactively apply some other state's law. 
This would retroactively destroy Potters bona fide 
purchaser status when they first purchased this property 
in 1993. Utah has never rejected the traditional rule, 
nor has New York, which was the source of the Utah rule. 
Obviously the rule remains as controlling precedent, 
until the Utah Supreme Court overturns Peck under the 
doctrine of stare decisis which would only have 
prospective effect on the future purchases and not 
retroactive effect on the current case. 
(b) The Quit Claim Deed transferring the 
alleged easement from Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. to Chadaz failed or three 
(3) reasons: (1) This easement is in 
gross, personal to Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. and non-assignable; (2) 
Potters are bona fide purchasers 
without notice of this Quit Claim 
Deed; and (3) Heritage Park Plaza is 
a defunct corporation without 
authority to transfer. 
When the grantor of an easement, such as Heritage 
Park Plaza, Inc., does not have any benefitted land (the 
dominant estate) , then the easement is treated as one in 
gross. See generally, 3 Powell, Real Property, paragraph 
405 and 419. Easements in gross are discouraged because 
they encumber land without providing a benefit to another 
land owner as previously stated above. If the easement 
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in gross is commercial in nature, it can sometimes be 
transferred. Commercial easements in gross typically 
apply to railroad easement, utility easements, billboard 
easements, cable easements and sewer easements. 
However non-commercial easements in gross are non-
transferable. These easements do not run with the land 
and are not appurtenant to the land. Because of their 
personal nature, they are limited to the parties 
involved. See generally Maw v. Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, 436 P.2d 230 (Utah 1968) (which 
discusses the personal rights of a father to cross upon 
land as a privilege to shoot in a duck club which was 
nontransferable to his children.) 
In the present case, Villatek, Inc. made a personal 
agreement as part of the purchase price of the property 
to construct a roadway to benefit Heritage Park Plaza, 
Inc. These Agreements were personal in nature since they 
were part of the purchase price for the land. Because 
Villatek, Inc. defaulted and never completed development 
thereof, the land was later foreclosed upon. The 
foreclosure action likewise terminated the consideration 
which included building the road. As a result, this 
personal covenant by Villatek, Inc. was terminated. 
Subsequent servient tenement owners cannot be burdened 
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with a covenant that was personally made by Villatek, 
Inc., which covenant was foreclosed upon over sixteen 
(16) years ago. (See generally, Walter v. Introcaso, 135 
NJL 461, 52 A.2d 676 (N.J. 1947). Accordingly, the 
transfer of land to subsequent owners vitiated the 
easement and terminated its existence. The easement in 
the context of the present case is not commercial since 
it applies personally to Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. and 
Villatek, Inc., for development of a proposed road. 
The Court in Wade, supra 5 09 N.E.2nd 3 09 at page 
310, stated: 
"Additionally, inasmuch as the right of way 
reserved to Noble personally was not shown to 
be commercial in nature, the appellate division 
correctly determined that it could not be 
transferred to plaintiff in the quit claim deed 
by the Noble Foundation." 
Likewise, because the reservation of the easement by 
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was conditioned on the personal 
performance of Villatek, Inc., this easement became 
nontransferable to subsequent owners and the easement 
terminated upon transfer. Because this easement is in 
gross it does not run with the land and is not 
appurtenant to the land. See generally Maw v. Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District, 436 P.2d 230 (Utah 
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1968) which held than an easement in gross is non-
transferable. 
In addition, Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was a defunct 
company by October 1983. Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. 
attempted to transfer the alleged easement to Chadaz by 
Quit Claim Deed on May 2, 1996, nearly three (3) years 
after Potter had purchased on July 23, 1993. Potter was 
a bona fide purchaser and did not have notice of any 
transfer between Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. and Chadaz 
when he originally purchased the property on July 23, 
1993. Consequently, Potter's purchase would take 
priority over the quit claim deed and would be free and 
clear of any attempt to restore the easement. Heritage 
Park Plaza, Inc, as a defunct, foreclosed upon entity, 
had no authority or rights to transfer in any event. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER WITHOUT 
NOTICE AND THE EASEMENT IS EXTINGUISHED, 
(a) Plaintiff as a bona fide purchaser takes 
the property free of the easement. 
A person who purchases land as a bona fide purchaser 
without knowledge, actual or constructive, of the 
existence of the easement, takes title to the property 
free and clear of the burdens of the easement. Horman v. 
Clark, 744 P. 2d 1014 (Utah App. 1987) . Potters were bona 
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fide purchasers of the land without actual or 
constructive knowledge of the easement for the following 
reasons: 
1. Potters purchased the property from Gary Bywater 
under a Warranty Deed which did not show the existence of 
any easement. 
2. The Title Company conducted a title search on 
the property and did not find any easement on the 
property. 
3. The Special Warranty Deed from Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. to Villatek, Inc. as discussed in Point I 
above, did not create an easement to Chadaz. In addition 
any right-of-way was only for the "purpose of a proposed 
road", which road should have been completed June 1, 1981 
and never was constructed. Potters had notice only that 
the easement had terminated and was never transferred 
properly. 
4. Chadaz was not a party to the Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. and Villatek, Inc. agreement and cannot 
allege Potters knew she had an easement, especially since 
her Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was 
nearly three (3) years after Potters purchase. 
5. There were no visible signs of an easement 
across the property for the purpose of a roadway. 
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6. Chadaz never gave notice to the Potters when 
they began construction of their building and improved 
the lot across the alleged easement that she was making 
any claim for a right-of-way until long after the 
improvements were made. 
7. The unrecorded contracts which contain language 
concerning the 66 foot right-of-way were never recorded. 
8. There is no plat maps or city street plans which 
show this easement. 
Potters, as bona fide purchasers, therefore take the 
property fee and clear of the easement. 
(b) Plaintiff Potters completed their duty 
of inquiry by diligently searching out 
the status of said property and 
purchased said property as bona fide 
purchasers free and clear of the 
easement. 
Chadaz attempts to claim that the mere recording of 
a Special Warranty Deed dated October 24, 1980 and 
recorded December 9, 1980, was sufficient to constitute 
constructive notice of the easement to all the world. 
Potters have shown that this reservation did not create 
an easement. (See argument Point I). 
In addition, even that recording indicates that the 
property was subject to a right-of-way for "the purpose 
of a proposed road." If the road is not completed as 
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proposed, then there is nothing to be "subject to". That 
road was never constructed and, as indicated above, the 
purpose for the roadway was extinguished by abandonment 
of the subdivision development. All purchasers 
subsequent to Villatek, Inc. purchased the property by 
Warranty Deed without any reference to this easement. 
The clear intention from these multiple conveyances show 
that the property was no longer to be considered for a 
subdivision and the need for a roadway no longer existed. 
All subsequent conveyances were made free and clear of 
any proposed road. 
Further, Heritage Park Plaza Inc. is not in privity 
with Chadaz since her agreements were all with Heritage 
Park Partners, a separate entity. Defendant Chadaz did 
not contract with Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. for a 
reservation of a roadway and cannot claim title to one 
now based on the Quit Claim Deed from this entity, which 
was recorded long after the Potters purchased the 
property. 
Under Utah's Recording Statute, an unrecorded 
conveyance is "void as against any subsequent purchaser 
in good faith and for valuable consideration of the same 
real estate . . . where his own conveyance shall be first 
duly recorded." Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-3(1986). 
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Thus, "a subsequent purchaser must . . . show that he had 
no actual notice, i.e. , no personal knowledge, of a prior 
conveyance or that the prior conveyance did not impart 
constructive notice." Diversified Equities, Inc. v. 
American Savings and Loan Association, 739 P.2d 1133 
(Utah App. Ct. 1987) at page 1136. Note, the recorded 
instrument can only impart to the person notice of its 
contents. The contents of the Special Warranty Deed in 
question indicate that it was an easement only for a 
"proposed road" to a third party, which is invalid to 
create an easement in Utah. No proposed road was ever 
built and no subdivision was completed and the purpose 
for said roadway was eliminated. 
In Diversified Equities, Inc., a mortgage broker, 
acting on behalf of a bona fide purchaser, was ruled to 
have met his duty of inquiry when he conducted the 
following: 
(1) A title search was performed and no encumbrances 
were shown according to the title report, although a 
mortgage had shown once and was released. 
(2) He personally contacted the previous secured 
party who claimed to have an encumbrance against the 
property, which party confirmed what the title search and 
other verbal and documentary evidence had told him. 
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(3) A physical inspection of the property did not 
reveal any such encumbrances. 
In Diversified Equities, Inc. the Court ruled: 
"While the circumstances were suspicious and 
called for inquiry, Pentalude, acting for Peck, 
inquired - and with sufficient diligence to 
meet the duty imposed by the doctrine of 
inquiry notice. He had a title search 
performed and he personally contacted American 
even though the results of Rydalches and 
Burnetts three prior contacts were accurately -
if disingenuously - communicated to him and 
even though he had a copy of the reconveyance, 
American confirmed what the title search, the 
reconveyance, Burnett and Rydalch all told him. 
Wayne Peck, acting for Dakol and Diversified, 
reasonably relied on the title search and the 
clear evidence, both documentary and verbal, of 
American's reconveyance. American negligently 
released its Trust Deed and its security 
interest will not be preserved against bona 
fide third party purchasers, who, at least on 
the facts as stipulated were bona fide 
purchasers without notice and without further 
duty to inquire. To hold otherwise would 
defeat the purpose of the recording statutes 
and subvert the sound commercial policy they 
promote." At page 1137. 
Although the facts in this case are slightly 
different than those in Diversified Equities, Inc., the 
analogies drawn therefrom can be matched with the steps 
Potters have taken. The Potters had a title search 
performed and according to the record no easement 
existed. Potters then personally contacted Chadaz and 
informed her they were purchasing the property and going 
to build across said property and that if she had any 
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difficulties with that she would need to appear at the 
zoning commission meetings where the building permit was 
to be granted. Chadaz indicated she was not concerned 
and that it would make no difference anyway. Potters 
also personally inspected the property and noted that it 
was a field of weeds which dropped sharply off of the 
Main Street curb, that there was a large ditch that 
prevented anyone from dropping off of that curb and 
crossing said property. There were no physical signs 
that this property had ever been crossed. 
The burden shifted to Chadaz to act to maintain any 
claim of a right-of-way that might have existed when bona 
fide purchasers were asking her questions about building 
on the property which would effectively destroy the 
right-of-way. Chadaz cannot remain silent, allow Potters 
to build, and then several years later argue that Potters 
should not have built over the top of her alleged 
easement and then ask the Court to do what she would not 
do for herself. 
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POINT III 
THE EASEMENT WAS ABANDONED OR TERMINATED, 
It is well recognized that an easement or right-of-
way may be abandoned. Western Gateway Storage Co. v. 
Treseder, 567 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1977) . To determine the 
issue of abandonment several factors are considered among 
which are: whether the right was acquired by 
prescription or grant, the extent of its use, and the 
actual intent of the owner. Nonuse alone is not 
sufficient, but when taken with other conduct of the 
owner can prove abandonment. Intent to abandon need not 
be an express intent, but could be implied from the 
facts. 25 Am. Jur. 2d. Easements and Licenses § 25. 
In the present case, the original owner of the 
easement abandoned the construction of the roadway and 
never did construct a road. In fact, all the property 
was forfeited and foreclosed upon and the roadway never 
pursued. The roadway has never been built or used in 
over sixteen (16) years. Subsequent owners of the 
property transferred property to other parties without 
referencing the easement or ever using said easement. 
Potters were allowed to purchase the property and build 
thereon by placing buildings, driveways, curb and gutter 
and landscaping across the easement without objection or 
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complaint by the dominant tenement. When all of these 
actions are considered as a whole, the clear intent is 
that the right-of-way never ripened, eventuated or was 
forfeited and no longer benefits the owner and subsequent 
owners have so recognized and allowed Potters to 
construct across said easement without complaint. These 
actions show that the owner released her claim to the 
right-of-way. See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses 
§ 25. 
(a) The terms of the original grant or 
deed of easement show that it was in 
consideration for the purchase of 
property and since the property was 
never fully purchased, construction 
of the subdivision was never started, 
and development of the road was 
abandoned and forfeited. 
In Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) the Court held 
that a change in conditions which is of significant 
magnitude can neutralize the benefits of the easement or 
the purpose of the easement and therefore render the 
easement of little or no value. See page 1261. Where an 
easement has not been created until the happening of a 
specific event or contingency, the easement will 
terminate ipso facto upon the non-happening of that 
event. See Irvin v. Petitfils, 112 P.2d 688 (Cal. 1941) 
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and Lyman v. Storage Company, 107 P. 286 (Colo. 1910). 
Additionally, when a deed creates an easement, the 
circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of 
the parties, and the object to be attained are also to be 
considered. Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d at 353 (Utah 1952) . 
In the present case, the easement was only to be 
created by Villatek, Inc. constructing a road and then 
dedicating the road to the City of Tremonton, which 
construction was to begin on or before June 1, 1981 and 
end before October 1, 1981. Villatek, Inc. never began 
construction, the road was never dedicated to the City of 
Tremonton, and the proposed road was abandoned. Villatek 
filed bankruptcy and could not complete construction of 
the road and the consideration for purchase of the 
property was lost and the property forfeited back to the 
secured lienholders. As a result, the contingency for 
building the road is an event which never occurred, and 
thus the easement was forfeited. 
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(b) Failure to use the easement for a 
roadway for which the easement was 
initially granted, particularly when 
the roadway was to be completed by 
October 1, 1981, indicates that the 
easement is no longer needed and 
results in its own termination. 
The law specifically provides that an easement will 
terminate if the purpose for which it was created was 
never enacted and there has been a failure to use the 
easement for a specified period which indicates the 
easement is no longer needed and will result in its own 
termination. See generally Mountain Cement Company v. 
Johnson, 884 P.2d 30 (Wyo. 1994); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements 
and Licenses §§ 111 and 115. 
Where an easement has been created subject to a 
condition subsequent, the easement may be terminated by 
the exercise of some affirmative act by the servient 
owner upon the breach or non-performance of the 
condition. 
In addition, where an easement is granted for the 
development of a road and the servient tenant obtained 
the property on condition and for consideration of 
building a roadway, and then subsequently defaults in 
building said roadway, the easement is lost for failure 
of consideration. This is particularly true when a 
subsequent purchaser at a foreclosure sale lacks notice 
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of the easement, since the easement is terminated by said 
foreclosure. See generally, Walter v. Introcaso, 135 NJL 
461 52 A.2d 676 (N.J. 1947) (wherein, a purchaser at 
foreclosure, even with constructive notice, took the 
property free of the easement). 
In the instant case, the facts reveal that pursuant 
to an Agreement dated November 14, 1980 between Heritage 
Park Plaza, Inc. and Villatek, Inc. that Villatek, Inc. 
agreed to develop a road over the East 66 feet of the 
subject property as consideration for purchase of said 
property. This roadway was to be commenced on or before 
June 1, 1981 and completed by October 1, 1981 and 
dedicated to the City of Tremonton. The Supplemental 
Agreement dated November 24, 1980 between Reta Chadaz and 
Heritage Park Partners and Triple S Development, Inc. 
specifically provided that the roadway would be complete 
with curb and gutter, sidewalk, sewer and pavement prior 
to October 1, 1981. The implication is that if the 
roadway is not completed and the subdivision not 
developed, then the easement's purpose is viated. 
Obviously, Heritage Park Partners, Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. and Villatek, Inc. all defaulted and failed 
to construct any roadway on the property. In fact, the 
agreement to development the property for a subdivision 
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was also in default and declared forfeited. No 
subdivision exists and no plat has ever been approved to 
this day. Consequently, the purpose for which the 
roadway was initially intended ceased with these defaults 
and the roadway was no longer necessary. That condition 
has remained from 1981 through today's date and Defendant 
Chadaz still has no formal plans approved by the City of 
Tremonton for a subdivision. 
When this property was foreclosed on by the trustee 
against Bradley Jorgensen, as well as against Golden 
Spike State Bank, the subsequent purchasers from those 
foreclosures all received title to the property without 
notice of said easement. They were given title to the 
property with no reference to the easement. Accordingly, 
the easement, by its own terms and purpose terminated 
because Defendant Chadaz' failures to develop said 
property and the subsequent foreclosures cleared that 
property of the easement from thence forward. 
(c) Potter's land, the servient parcel, 
was severed from the dominant parcel 
and no longer abuts against the same, 
causing a termination of the easement. 
"The partition of the dominant tenement cannot 
create a further or additional easement across a servient 
tenement, and an easement of way does not enure to the 
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benefit of the owner of the parcel which after division 
does not abut on the way; and where resulting use will 
increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right 
to the easement will be extinguished." Wood v. Ashby, 
253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952) at page 354. 
In the present case, Chadaz lost at least 1.58 acres 
of the dominant parcel to several other owners and Chadaz 
currently only owns 35 acres out of the original 47.12 
acres. FDIC foreclosed on the property and transferred 
part of the property to Gary and Karleen Bywater. Gary 
Bywater's parcel was split in half and transferred to 
Plaintiff Potter. Bywater's remaining property is now 
between Potter's property and Chadaz's property and 
therefore Chadaz's property no longer abuts the servient 
tenement. Since the dominant tenement has been 
partitioned from 47.12 acres to 35 acres and Chadaz's 
property no longer abuts on the way to the easement, the 
right-of-way is extinguished. 
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POINT IV 
CHADAZ IS BARRED BY EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL FROM 
CLAIMING AN EASEMENT. 
(a) Chadaz is estopped from claiming an 
easement. 
The case of Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) 
discusses the issue of whether an easement could be 
terminated on grounds of equitable estoppel and ruled 
that it could if there was a lack of diligence on the 
part of the owner of the dominant estate which resulted 
in an injury to the servient estate because of such lack 
of diligence. This is particularly true if you use a 
balance of injury test showing that the loss of easement 
does not irreparably injure the dominant tenement, and 
the cost of having the easement are disproportionate and 
impressive compared to the benefits derived from it and 
where the dominant tenement can receive access to their 
property from other right-of-way points. The doctrine of 
balancing the equities or relative hardships is reserved 
for innocent servient tenant holders who proceed without 
knowledge or warning that they are encroaching upon 
another's property rights. See generally pages 1259 
through 1261 of Sugarhouse Shopping Center, case above. 
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In the present case, the Plaintiff innocently and 
without notice, fully believed that they owned their 
property free and clear of any easement. They 
constructed a building across the easement complete with 
driveways, curb and gutter, cement walls and landscaping. 
During the period of construction, the Defendant Chadaz 
never objected or attempted to stop construction although 
she had the opportunity to do so on several occasions. 
Because she waited nearly two (2) years after the 
improvements were made, she should be equitably estopped 
from asserting her rights to the easement. In addition, 
the balance of equities show that Potters would suffer 
irreparable harm, losing all of the property purchased, 
if they were forced to remove their improvements and 
would lose a valuable opportunity to expand their 
business whereas, Defendant Chadaz has other access 
routes to her property with adequate frontage and still 
could obtain rights-of-way from other sources. As such, 
the alleged right-of-way should be terminated. 
(b) Chadaz is equitably estopped from 
trying to revive or claim an easement 
across the subject property where she 
has allowed Potters, the servient 
estate, to take action inconsistent 
with her claim of easement with 
justifiable reliance upon her 
nonaction and statements. 
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An easement may be extinguished by abandonment or 
estoppel if the owner of the servient estate takes action 
inconsistent with the easement's continued existence 
based upon reasonable reliance that the owner of the 
dominant estate does not intend to make future use of the 
servient estate. See generally, Rollston v. Sea Island 
Properties, Inc., 254 GA 183, 327 SE.2d 489, cert, denied 
474 U.S. 823 (Ga. 1985) . In addition, a dominant estate 
owner's failure to object to development on the servient 
estate that interferes with the easement may also result 
in abandonment of the easement. Chase v. Eastman, 563 
A.2d 1099 (ME 1989); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easement & Licensing 
§ 113 . 
In the present case, the dominant estate owner, 
Chadaz failed to object to the development on Potter's 
property when she was given the chance to do so. Chadaz 
never informed Potter that she intended to use the 
easement and there were no physical signs on the property 
that it would ever be used. Potter, upon reasonable 
reliance from Chadaz, improved the property and built a 
driveway, cement walls, sprinkler line and poured several 
tons of gravel into the sunken area to build it up for 
access to his building; costing over $15,000.00. Chadaz 
should have reasonably foreseen that Potter would have 
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relied on her inaction and her verbal statements to his 
detriment. It is against justice and equity to now 
permit her to suddenly argue that her easement has been 
revived and she is now going to use that easement as 
access to vacant land proposed as a subdivision when no 
subdivision currently exists. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Plaintiff Potter is entitled to 
Summary Judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that 
the easement could not be created in a third person. The 
easement was terminated or its purpose abandoned and the 
easement never ripened or came into being, the servient 
tenement no longer abuts the dominant tenement and Chadaz 
is estopped and has other access roads to her property. 
Potter requests that the Court of Appeals uphold the 
Trial Court decision as correct on those legal issues as 
a matter of law and that no material facts presented by 
Chadaz justifies taking this case to trial. 
DATED this //T" day of August, 1998. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Marlin J. Grant, hereby certify that on the 
day of August, 1998, I served two (2) true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Reed W. 
Hadfield and Stephen R. Hadfield, the counsel for the 
appellant in this matter, and I served two (2) copies of 
the attached Brief of Appellee upon Gary Bywater, 
Defendant, and two copies upon Karleen C. Bywater, 
Defendant, by mailing them to them by first class mail 
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following 
addresses: 
Reed W. Hadfield 
Stephen R. Hadfield 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Gary Bywater 
375 North 600 West 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Karleen Bywater 
375 North 600 West 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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Warranty Deed from Hillam Abstracting & Insurance Agency, 
Inc. to Heritage Park Partners. 
Agreement dated November 14, 1980. 
Warranty Deed from Villatek, Inc. to Bradley J. 
Jorgensen. 
Trustee's Deed by John L. Bessinger to Golden Spike State 
Bank. 
Quit Claim Deed from Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation as Liquidator of Golden Spike Bank to James 
Holmgren. 
Warranty Deed from James Holmgren to Bary Bywater and 
Karleen C. Bywater. 
Warranty Deed from Gary Bywater and Karleen C. Bywater to 
Dean R. Potter and Diane B. Potter. 
Policy of Title Insurance by First American Title 
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Affidavit of Dean R. Potter dated December 23, 1996. 
Zoning Meeting Minutes and Page 2 of Affidavit of Dean R. 
Potter dated December 23, 1996. 
Map showing roads available. 
Affidavit of Maurice Staples dated November 14, 1996. 
Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. to Reta 
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WARRANTY DEED 
FLOYD CHADAZ AND RETA CHADAZ, HIS WIFE 
of Tremonton . County of 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to 
Box Elder 
, grantor S 
. State of Utah, 
KILLAM ABSTRACTING & INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Trustee, pursuant to a Trust Agreement dated the 12th day of May,198 
, grante% 
of Brigham C i t y . County of BOX Elder , State of Utah 
for the sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars & other valuable consideations xxfKSia&RSsx 
the following described tract of land in Box Elder County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Beg., at a pt. 54.4 ft S. of the N.E.corner of the N.W.1/4 
of Sec.lO.T.ll.N.R.3.W.S.L.B & M., and running East 30.0 ft, 
thence S.830.8 ft; thence N.83°37,35" E.183.6 ft; thence S. 
161.5 ft; thence N.88°37,35M E.103.7 ft; thence S.5°30« W. 
337.3 ft; thence N.88°37,35" E.50.0 ft; thence S.5o30' W. 
851.3 ft; thence on a curve to the right of 500 foot radius 
a distance of 725.4 ft (Note: Chord of said curve bears 
S.50o05' W.624.8 ft); thence S.88°37'35M W.423.2 ft along 
an established fence which is parallel to the half-section 
line and 50 ft N. therefrom; thence N.0°04,10M E.2563.4 ft; 
thence N. 88°37 • 35_ME236.0 ft; thence S.191.3 ft; thence 
N.88°37'35M E.410.0 ft; thence N.191.0 ft to the point of beg 
containing 47.12 acres. 
The sellers reserve the right to remove the two steel 
granaries located upon the above described property. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantors, this 12 day of May , 19 80 
0~ fea^dzzzy' Reta Chadaz, h i s wig^r 
STATE OF UTAH, | 
\ S3. 
County of Box Elder J 
On the 12 day of May ^ 80 
personally appeared before me
 F i 0 y d Chadaz and Reta Chadaz, h i s w i f e 
the signer
 s of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged toTta that they executed the 
UIIM&^L 
/ Notary Public 
My commission expires Jan...8.,.l_9£2 Residing in Bxi^ajft_Ci£y^p.tal} 
APPROVED FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
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 DePUty 
£ Harratttu; §e?a 
(Corporate Form) 
^ HILLAM ABSTRACTING & INSURANCE AGENCY, I N C , TRUSTEE, a coi-p.iialio,, 
1^ organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at 
»* Brighara C i t y , of County of Box E l d e r . Slate of Utah, 
grantor, hereby conveys and warrants to 
5^ HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS 
J 
3 Granteo 
* of K a y s v i l l e , D a v i s C o u n t y , S t a t e o f U t a h for the sum of 
^ T e n and N o / 1 0 0 DOLLARS, 
1 the following described tract of land in Box E l d e r County, 
-J State of Utah: 
$ Beginning at a point, said point being South 54 feet 
\ and West 410 feet from the Northeast Corner of the 
•* North half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10 
I
 A\p Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
,il 'V thence running South 291.63 feet, thence West 236 
i^j feet, thence North 291.63 feet, thence East 236 feet 
4 to the point of beginning. 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the grantor 
at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
by its duly authorized officers this 1 2 t h day of May A. D., 19 gO, 
Af, ef. \ HILLAM ABSTRACTING & INSURANCE AGENCY, INC, 
At
 / / ' , ) By TRUSTEE 
v.jZ^<*r.^^ \ sZfr *m<ric/y,^ 
f r Secretary. \ .1^&^±.&.J&!^ 
(Corporate Seal) / President. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Box E l d e r 
On the 1 2 t h day of May , A. D. 1 9 3 0 
personally appeared before me C l a r k M. H i l l a m and Hannah H i l l a m 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said C l a r k M« H i l l a m 
is the president, and he, the said Hannah H i l l a m T r u s t e e i s t h e s c c r e t a i v 
of H i l l a m A b s t r a c t i n g & I n s u r a n c e A g e n c y , Inc/md that the within and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of direc-
tors and said C l a r k M. H i l l a m and Hannah H i l l a r a 
each*, duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed 
is the seal: of said corporation. 
.j£:tJ.^.^L;:XS±-!.^ 
' Notary Public. 




THIS AGREEMENT made on the 14th day of November, 1980, by and between 
HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, INC., a Utah Corporation, hereinafter refered to as 
VENDORS, and VILLATEK, INC., a Utah Corporation, hereinafter refered to &s 
PURCHASERS, of that certain property known as VILLAGE COURT COMMERCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT, 
WHEREAS, the above Vendors have agreed to sell, and the above Purchasers 
have agreed to purchase the aforementioned property, which property is more 
particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO 
WHEREAS, said purchasers have agreed that in order to induce said Vendors 
to sell subject property for an amount which has been determined and agreed 
upon by both parties herein, they will assume certain responsibilities in 
connection with said property. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises, and 
of their mutual promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers agree to develope a road over the East 66 feet of subject 
property, which road shall be approved by the City of Tremonton, prior to 
development, and dedicated to same City of Tremonton, following completion 
of development, said development to commence on or before June 1, 1981. 
Both parties herein, agree that this agreement shall apply to them, their 
heirs, successors, and/or assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto, 
on the date set forth above. 
"VENDOR" HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, INC., a Utah Corporation 
bv JAMES C. KAI PRESIDENT 
"PURCHASERS" VILLATEK, INC., a Utah Corporation 
!L1H. CAHPBfiLLTWBIteff 
SCHEDULE A 
PART OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10f TUN, R3W, SLB 
* H: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF THE HIGHWAY RIGHT-
OF-WAY WHICH IS LOCATED S89° 51*47f,W 637.42 FEET ALONG THE 
SECTION LINE AND SO0 35'46WW 50*00 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST 
CORNER OF THE NORTHWEST ONE QUARTER OF SECTION 10, TllN, R3W 
SLB & M; POINT OF BEGINNING ALSO BEING LOCATED N89° 51*47WE 
3*00 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF PLAT R, TREMONTON 
CITY SURVEY, THENCE S0° 35'46ffW 292.80 FEET, THENCE N89° 
47'46nE 237.84 FEET, THENCE N0° 26'27WW 292.50 FEET ALONG 
AN EXISTING FENCE TO THE SOUTH HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE 
THENCE S89° 51'47WW 232,54 FEET ALONG SAID SOUTH LINE TO THE 
POINT OF BEGINNING* 
CONTAINS 1*58 ACRES 
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(Corporate Form) 
VILLATEK INC. ..corporation \ 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at i 
450 East 1000 North, N.S.L. . of County of Davis . State of Utah, j 
trantor, hereby conveys and warrants to Bradley J. Jorgensen, a married man J 
Grantee 
of Sa l t Lake C i t y , County of Sa l t Lake, State of Utah for the sum of 
Ten and NO/100 and other good and valuable consideration DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Box Elder County, 
State of Utah: 
See Exhibi t "Aw 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
tliereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the grantor 
at a lawful meeting1 duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
by its duly authorized officers this 2 5 day of February A. D., 19 8 2 , 
;,Attest: r, \ £I14ATEK INC Company 
V .* I/, / ' B v ' ' ^ 
-"TTT:; ^^^^\ ,J^^<(:JL..ZI..:^^.^^,^ 
^(Corporate Seal) / President 
f
 STATE OF UTAH, 1 
^S. * J sa. 
Cogntyof Oavis l i 
On the 2 5 day of February .A.D. , 9 8 2 
personally appeared before me Russe 11 H Campbe 11
 and Vaughn R Cook 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said Russe 11 H Campbe 11 
is the president, and he, the said Vaughn R Cook *s *n e secretary 
of vi I latek Inc. Company, and that the within and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of direc-
* tors and said Russe 11 H Campbe I I «*<* Vaughn R Cook 
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed 
is the seal of said corporation. 
.iX&ftLatw?^ } 
Notary Public. \ 
My Commission expires JO: '!>(J:>. JKiy residence is..M..-.l:'A\.'..J.tjJ-1j..Lt. I 
eooK 3 5 5 P * G E 2 1 8 
Part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, T. 11 
N., R. 3 W. SLBM. Beginning at a point on the South 
line of the Highway right-of-way which is located 
South 89051,47" West 637.42 feet along the Section 
Line and South OOSSMS" West 50.00 feet from the 
Northeast corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W. SLBfcM; point of beginninq also 
being located North 89°51'47H East 3.00 feet from the 
Northeast corner of Plat R# Tremonton City Survev, 
thence South 0°35*46" West 300.05 feet, thence North 
89°47M6M East 231.06 feet, thence North 299.75 feet 
to the South Highway right-of-way line (Point also 
being the Northwest corner of the Harris Truck and 
Equipment, Inc. property), thence South 89°51*47M 
West 227.94 feet along said South Highway right-of-
way line to the point of beginning. Contains 1.58 
acres. 
LESS THE FOLLOWING: 
Part of the Northwest quarter of section 10 Township 
11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
more particularly described as follows: Beginning 
at a point which lies South 89°51,47M West 637142 
feet along the section line and South 0°35*46w West 
50.00 feet from the Northeast corner of the North-
west quarter of said section 10, Township 11 North, 
Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; said point 
of beginning lyinq on the South line of highway right-
of-way and is also North 89°51'47" East 3.00 feet from 
the Northeast corner of Plat R, Tremonton City survey 
and running thence South 0°35,46" West 92.94 feet; 
thence North 89°51M7" East 161.90 feet; thence North 
92.93 feet to said South line of the highway right-of-
way, thence South 89°51*47H West along said South line 
of highway right-of-way 160.94 feet to the point of 
beginning containing 15,000 square feet. 
*2STD ::. SOCK >^> CK^JLss H<EC / r ^ J 
ADDENDUM 5 
Addendum 5 
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Deputy 
TRUSTEE'S DEED
 0 ^ n oin 
BOOK 0/yfAG£^4y 
I. JOHN L. BESSINGER, Trustee of the hereafter described 
real property, state as follows: 
WHEREAS. I was appointed as Substitute Trustee on June 
3, 1983, of that certain Deed of Trust, dated May 7, 1982, 
and recorded on August 2, 1982, in Book 361, Page 73, of the 
Official Records of Box Elder County, and 
WHEREAS. I caused to be recorded a Notice of Default af-
fecting the hereafter described real property on the 17th day 
of June, 1983, in Book 372. Page 762. Recorder #9872AH at the 
Box Elder County Recorder's Office, and 
WHEREAS, copies of the Notice of Default were delivered 
by certified mail to Bradley J. Jorgensen and all other parties 
claiming an interest in and to said real property, namely: 
Vaughn Cook and Associates, D. Ray Hill and Reid Joseph Hill, 
the Internal Revenue Service, and Clint S. Judkins, as Attorney 
for the City of Tremonton, and 
WHEREAS, I was granted a Power of Sale, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated 57-1-23 and exercised said Power of Sale by 
publication of the same in a newspaper having general circu-
lation in the County of Box Elder, State of Utah, once a week 
for three (3) consecutive weeks, all in accordance with Utah 
Code Annotated 57-1-25, and 
BOOK 37^250 
WHEREAS, I delivered by certified mail a copy of the Notice 
of Trustee's Sale to Bradley J. Jorgensen, Vaughn Cook and 
Associates, the Internal Revenue Service, D. Ray Hill, Reid 
Joseph Hill, and Clint S. Judkins, 
WHEREFORE, in accordance with said Notice of Sale, and 
pursuant to Title 57-1-28 of the Utah Code Annotated, the fol-
lowing described real property was sold, assigned and conveyed 
to Golden Spike State Bank, at public auction, as highest bidder 
for the sum of $20,000.00, lawful money of the United States, 
which said sum includes the principal amount due and owing 
Golden Spike State Bank, plus interest, costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in selling the real property; that said sale 
was conducted on the 2nd day of November, 1983, at the hour 
of 10:30 a.m., at the door of the Box Elder County Courthouse, 
located in Brigham City, Utah; that no other bids were received 
for purchase of the real property, more particularly described 
as follows: 
"Part of the Northwest quarter of Section 10, 
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, more particularly described as 
follows: Beginning at a point which lies South 
89°51'A7" West along a section line 637.A2 feet 
and South 0°35'A6" West 1A2.9A feet from the 
Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of 
said Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 3 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; said point 
of beginning lying South 0°35'A6M West 92.9A 
feet from a point which lies on the South line 
of highway right-of-way and running thence South 
0°35'A6" West 207-11 feet; thence North 89°A7'A6" 
East 16A.06 feet; thence North 206.90 feet thence 
South 89°51'A7" West 161.90 feet to the point of 
beginning, containing 0.77A AC." 
-2-
379^251 
WHEREFORE, this Deed now conveys to GOLDEN SPIKE STATE 
BANK, without right of redemption, all of my title, interest 
and estate in and to said real property, as well as all of 
the rights, title, interest and claims of BRADLEY J. JORGENSEN, 
as Trustor, his successors in interest and all other persons 
claiming by, through or under him in and to the above described 
real property, including all such right, title, interest and 
claim in and to such property acquired by BRADLEY J. JORGENSEN, 
as Trustor, or his successor in interest, subsequent to the 
execution of the Trust Deed mentioned above. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign this Deed as Trustee and Grantor 
this / d a y of / Y ^ ^ ^ 1 9 8 3 . 
John L. Bessinger, Trustee w"~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this // day of 
7j Itr-^-J^ , 1983. Da 
5 T O ^ Q -
My Commission Expires: Notary Public 
'..:,., • •
 f? - 3-7>~ %'L Residing at Treraonton, Utah 





Recorded ac Request of 
at Fee Paid % 
by 
E3 :37 25 F!l 2:36 
dOOK 5jQfASS 5 0 
Book Page Entry No. 
Address 7?TN j>$o £ /* V,«yx,*r>i it*3V3&? Hai l tax n o t i c e to jn,»»U« 
tt-tl+ cof/ * 
££2LJ QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
{Corporate Form] 
F e d e r a l D e p o s i t I n s u r a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n a s L i q u i d a t o r o f 
G o l d e n S p i k e S t a t e B a n k 
, a c o r p o r a t i o n 
o r g a n i z e d and e x i s t i n g under the laws of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , w i t h i t s p r i n c i p a l 




f o r the sum o f 
TEN AND NO/100 •;—-r -. 3 : — r r 7^ ZT DOLLARS, 
and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
the f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d t r a c t o f l and i n Box E lder 
***See a t t a c h e d E x h i b i t A * * * 
County, 
Dated t h i s 8 t h day o f N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 1 
7EDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 
as Liquidator of Golden Spike State 
Bank . ~ . .,. 
BY: 
STATE Of CAUFOFlNU 
COUNTY Of OfJANGE 
On**s ~±*1 oayot 
a notary puohc personalty. 
Nov- « •w ye;' 19 $± 
to me on toe basis of satisfactory e 
of "x Federal Oeoos* insurance Corpora* 
Edward Kato 
Judy C. Ruiz 
b« ine person wno executed this instrument as 
:f OCi and acknowledged to me mat the FOtC eaecuted 4. 
personaty known 10. me (0/ proved 




i to me that 
(This area (or notary n i l i i i i i i * » l 
eoot 51(W 51 
EXHIBIT A 
The land referred to herein is situate in the State of Uti-h, County 
of Box Elder and is described as follows: 
PARCEL 1: (05-060-0(41) Part of the Northwest Quarter of Section \ 
10, Township 11 North, Range 3 Vest, SLM, more particularly described 
as follows: Beginning at a point which lies South 89°51*47«' 
West along a Section Line €37,42 feet and South 0°35M6,< Vest 
142.94 feet from the Northeast Corner of the Northwest Quarter of 
said Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 3 We£t, SLM; said point of 
beginning lying South 0°35,46,< West 92.94 feet from a point 
which lies on the South line of Highway right of way and running 
thence South 0<)35,46,« West 207.11 feet; thence North 
89°47<46"
 E a s t 164.06 feet; thence North 206.90 feet; thence 
South 89051*47,* West 161.90 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: (05-060-0038) Beginning at a point which lies South 
89°51*47•• West 476.48 feet along the Section line and South 
0°35*A6t9 West 50 feet from the Northeast Corner of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 3 West, 
SLM., said point of beginning lying on the South line of State 
Highway right of way and is also North 89°51*47*' East 163.94 
from the Northeast Corner of Plat R, TREMONTON CITY Survey, running 
thence South O^S^e* 1 West 299.83 feet; thence North 
89°47'46" East 67 feet; thence North 299.75 feet to State 
Highway right of way line (said point also being the Northwest 
Corner of the Harris Truck and Equipment Inc. property); thence 
South 89°51*47•• West 67 feet along State Highway right of way 








W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
SOCK 546'AG<:703 
r.,uMx of
 B o x E l d c r tumor ot Tremonton 
>utv of LJJI". iurt)\ U'.VL^ a - \FR\ 1 10 
CARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C. BYWATER, his wife as joint tenants and not 
as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship, 
83 South Main 
„ranues of Brighare C i t y 
KK 1.1 u.jof TEN DOLLARS AND OTHhR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 
the following described if act of lai.d m Box Elder Count) Mate of Utah 
PARCEL 1: 05 -060-0041 
Fart of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 
3 West, Salt Lake Meridian 
BEGINNING at a point which lies South 89*51*47" West along a Section 
Line 637.42 feet and South 0*35*46" West 142.94 feet from the 
Northeast Corner of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 10, 
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian; said point of 
beginning lying South 0*35'46" West 92.94 feet from a point which 
lies on the South line of Highway right of way and running thence 
South 0*35*46" West 207.11 feet; thence North 89*47*46" East 164.06 
feet; thence North 206.90 feet; thence South 89*51*47" West 161.90 
feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 2: 05-060-0038 
BEGINNING at a point which lies South 89*51,47" West 476.48 feet along 
the Section line and South 0*35*46" West 50 feet from the Northeast 
Corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, 
Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, said point of beginning lying on 
the South line of State Highway right of way and is also North 
89*51*47" East 163.94 feet from the Northeast Corner of Plat R, 
Tremonton City Survey, running thence South 0*35*46" West 299.83 
feet; thence North 89*47*46" East 67 feet; thence North 299.75 feet 
to State Highway right of way line (said point also being the 
Northwest Corner of the Harris Truck and Equipment Inc. property), 
thence South 89*51*47" West 67 feet along State Highway right of way 
line to the point of BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 3/ 05-136-0069 
Lot 25, Block 8, PARK MEADOWS SUBDIVISION, Plat B, according to the 
official plat thereof. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor 
signed in the presence of 
4 th day of June 
I ( V 'James Holmgren / 
AD 19 93 
STATE OF UTAH 
is 
County of Box Elder 
On the 4th da> of June 
AD !"• 93 persooali) appeared before iTie 
JAMES HOLMGREN 
th«. uiur of ih« within tn»trument. who dul) 
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GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C. BYWATER 
grantor of Brigham C i t y County of
 B o x Eider 
Slate of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to 
DEAN R. POTTER and DIANE B. POTTER, his wife as joint tenants 
and not as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship, 
BOOK 965 South Main 
grantees of Garland 
tor the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 
the following described tract of land in Box Elder County. State of Utah: 
Tax Number: ^05-060-0038' 
>i~. 06,0 - *o£Sf*fa**~^-*^ 
BEGINNING at a point which lies South 89°51,47" West 476.48 feet along 
the Section line and South 0°35,46M West 50 feet from the Northeast 
Corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 
3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, said point of beginning lying on the South 
line of State Highway right of way and is also North 89°51'47" East 
163.94 feet from the Northeast Corner of Plat R, Tremonton City Survey, 
running thence South 0°35,46" West 178.00 feet; thence North 89°47,46" 
East 67 feet; thence North 178.00 feet to State Highway right of way 
line (said point also being the Northwest Corner of the Harris Truck 
and Equipment Inc. property); thence South 89°51,47" West 67 feet along 
State Highway right of way line to the point of BEGINNING. 
Reserving to the grantor a right of way for ingress and egress over 
the West 20 feet. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantors . this 2 3 r d day of J u l y 
Signed in the presence of 
A.D. 19 93 
cMh\ 
STATE OF UTAH 
_ . ^r SUA E l d e r County of T 
On the 2 3 r d day of J u l y 
A.D. 19 93 personally appeared before me 
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C. BYWATER 
the signers of the within 
acknowledged to me that t h e 
tOWWPUBUC 
<§v BRAD MORTENS^ 
VYg WtetFofttt 
touted the 
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POLICY OF T I M INSURANCE 
40 
ISSUED BY 
First American Title Insurance Company 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS FROM COVERAGE CONTAINED IN 
SCHEDULE B AND THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS, FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
California corporation, herein called the Company, insure^ as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A against loss or 
damage, not exceeding the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, sustained or incurred by the insured by 
reason of. 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested other than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title; 
3. Unmarketabiiity of the title; 
4. Lack of a right of access to and from the land. 
The Company will also pay the costs, attorneys1 fees and expenses incurred in defense of the title, as insured, but only to 
the extent provided in the Conditions and Stipulations. 
First American Titk Insurance Company 






EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy and the Company will not pay loss or damage, costs, attorneys' fees or 
expenses which arise by reason of. 
1 . (a) Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning laws, ordinances, or regulations) restricting 
regulating, prohibiting or relating to (Q the occupancy, use, or enjoyment of the land; (if) the character, dimensions or location of any improvement 
now or hereafter erected on the lan6; (BQ a separation to ownership orachange In toe d i m e n ^ ^ 
is or was a part; or (rv) environmental protection, or the effect of any violation of these laws, ordinances or governmental regulations, except to the 
extent that a notice of the enforcement thereof or a notice of a defect lien or encumbrance resulting from a violation or alleged violation affecting 
the land has been recorded in the public records at Date of Policy, 
(b) Any governmental police power not excluded by (a) above, except to the extent that a notice of the exercise thereof or a notice of a defect, lien or 
encumbrance resulting from a violation or alleged violation affecting the land has been recorded in the public records at Oate of Policy. 
2. Rights of eminent domain unless notice of the exercise thereof has been recorded in the public records at Oate of Policy, but not excluding from 
coverage any taking which has occurred pnor to Oate of Policy which would be binding on the rights of a purchaser for value without 
knowledge. 
3 Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters 
(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant, 
(b) not knownto the Company, not recorded in the public records at Date of Policy, but known to the insured claimant and not disclosed in writing to 
the Company by the insured claimant prior to the date the insured claimant became an insured under this policy, 
(c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant, 
(d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy, or 
(e) resulting in loss or damage which would not have been sustained if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured 
by this policy 
4 Any claim, which anses out of the transaction vesting in the insured the estate or interest insured by this policy, by reason of the operation of federal 
bankruptcy, state insolvency, or similar creditors' rights laws 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
1 . DEFINITION OF TERMS 
The following terms when used in this policy mean. 
(a) "insured" the Insured named in Schedule A, and, 
subject to any rights or defenses the Company would have had 
against the named insured, those who succeed to the interest 
of the named insured by operation of law as distinguished from 
purchase Including, but not limited to, heirs distributees, 
devisees, survivors, personal representatives next of kin, or 
corporate or fiduciary successors 
(b) -insured claimant" an insured claiming loss or 
damage. 
(c) "knowledge" or "known"* actual knowledge, not 
constructive knowledge or notice which may be imputed to an 
insured by reason of the public records as defined in this policy 
or any other records which impart constructive notice of mat 
ters affecting the land. 
(d) "land" the land described or referred to in Schedule 
(A), and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute 
real property The term "land" does not include any property 
beyond the lines of the area described or referred to in 
Schedule (A), nor any right title, interest, estate or easement 
m abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or 
waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit the extent 
to which a right of access to and from the land is insured by 
this policy 
(e) "mortgage"* mortgage. 6ee6 of trust, trust deed or 
other security instrument 
(f) "public records" records established under state 
statutes at Oate of Policy for the purpose of imparting con-
structive notice of matters relating to real property to pur 
chasers for value and without knowledge With respect lo 
Section 1(a)0v) of the Exclusions From Coverage "public 
records"* shall also include environmental protection liens fried 
in the records of the clerk of the United States district court for 
the district in which the land is located 
(g) "unmarketabttity of the title" an alleged or apparent 
matter affecting the title to the land, not excluded or excepted 
froma)mage,wWchwouWenWlearxjrcriaseroftheestateor 
interest described In Schedule A to be released from the 
obligation to purchase by virtue of a contractual condition 
requiring tbe ddrvery«of marketable title. 
2. CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE AFTER 
mUVFYAMfTOr-TITIF 
the basis of loss or damage and shall state, to the extent possi 
ble, the basis of calculating the amount of the loss or damage 
If the Company is prejudiced by the failure of the insured 
claimant to provide the required proof of loss or damage, the 
Company's obligations to the insured under the policy shall 
terminate, including any liability or obligation to defend, pros 
ecute, or continue any litigation, with regard to the matter or 
matters requiring such proof of loss or damage 
In addition, the insured claimant may reasonably be re-
quired to submit to examination under oath by any authorized 
representative of the Company and shall produce for examina 
tion, inspection and copying at such reasonable times and 
places as may be designated by any authorized representative 
of the Company, all records, books ledgers, checks, corre-
spondence and memoranda, whether bearing a date before or 
after Oate of Policy, which reasonably pertain to the loss or 
damage. Further if requested by any authorized representa 
uve of the Company, the insured claimant shall grant its per 
mission, in writing, for any authorized representative of the 
Company to examine, inspect and copy all records, books 
ledgers, checks, correspondence and memoranda in the cus 
tody or control of a third party, which reasonably pertain to the 
loss or damage. All information designated as confidential by 
the insured claimant provided to the Company pursuant to this 
Section shall not be disclosed to others unless, in the reason-
able judgment of the Company, It is necessary in the adrmms 
tratwn of the daim. Failure of the insured claimant to submit 
f a examination under oath, produce other reasonably request 
ed information or grant permission to secure reasonably 
necessary information from third parties as required in this 
paragraph, unless prohibited by law or governmental regula 
tion, shall terminate any liability o1 the Company under this 
policy as to that claim 
6 OPTIONS TO PAY OR OTHERWISE SETTLE CLAIMS. 
TERMINATION OF LIABILITY 
In case of a claim under this policy, the Companv shall have 
the following additional options: 
(a) To Pay or Tender Payment of the Amount of 
Insurance, 
Topayortende* J . _ "t** the amount of Insurance 
under this poTicy together wrth any tosts, attorneys' fees and 
expenses Incurred by the insured claimant, which were 
(b) In the event of any litigation, including litigation by 
the Company or with the Company's consent, the Company 
shall have no liability for loss or damage until there has been 
a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
and disposition of all appeals therefrom, adverse to trie titlr 
as insured 
(c) The(>)mparystennotbeliableforlossordamageto 
any insured for liability voluntarily assumed by the insured 
in settling any claim or suit without the prior written consent 
of the Company 
10 REDUCTION OF INSURANCE, REDUCTION OR 
TERMINATION OF LIABILITY 
All payments under this policy except payments mad*1 
for costs attorneys* fees and expenses, shall reduce th 
amount of the insurance pro tanto 
11 LIABILITY NONCUMULATIVL 
It is expressly understood that the amount of insurance 
under this policy shall be reduced by any amount the Com 
pany may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage to whicf 
exception is taken m Schedule B or to which the insured ha 
agreed, assumed, or taken subject, or which is hereafte 
executed by an insured and which is a charge or fien on th 
estate or interest described or referred to in Schedule A, arv 
the amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under thi 
policy to the insured owner 
12 PAYMENT OF LOSS 
(a) No payment shall be made without producing thi 
policy for endorsement of the payment unless the oofcey ha 
been tost or destroyed, m which case proof of loss or destruc 
tion shall be furnished to the satisfaction ol the Compam 
(b) When liability and the extent of loss or damag 
has been definitely fixed in accordance with these Condition 
and Stipulations, the toss or damage shall be payable with? 
30 days thereafter 
13. SUBROGATION UPON PAYMENT 
OR SETTLEMENT. 
(a) The Company's RlgMT* Sobrog^w 
Whenever the Company shall have settled arrtpaW 
Halm unoW thk rWirv all nnht nf Pronation shan vest 
insured in any transfer or conveyance c 
TWs policy snail not continue in force in favor of any purchaser 
from the insured of either (0 an estate or interest in the (and, or 
(ft) an indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage 
given to the insured. 
3. NOTICE Of CLAIM TO BE GIVEN BY 
INSURED CLAIMANT. 
The insured shad notify the Company prornptlyfo writing® 
kiwseofanylru^tk)nassetforthlnSection4(a)bek)wX^w 
case knowledge shall come to an insured hereunder otany 
claim of title or interest which is adverse to the title to the 
estate or interest, as insured, and which might cause toss or 
damage for which the Company may be liable by virtue of this 
policy, or (Kl) if title to the estate or interest, as insured, is 
rejected as unmarketable. If prompt notice shall not be grvento 
the Company, then as to the insured all fiabulty of the Com-
pany shall terminate with regard to the matter or matters for 
which prompt notice is required; provided, however, that 
failure to notify the Company shall in no case prejudice the 
rights of any insured under this policy unless the Company 
shad be prejudiced by the failure and then only to the extent of 
the prejudice. 
4. OEFENSEANO PROSECUTION OF ACTIONS; 
DUTY OF INSURED CLAIMANT TO COOPERATE 
(a) Upon written request by the insured and subject to 
the options contained in Section 6 of these Conditions and 
Stipulations, the Company, at its own cost and without unrea-
sonable delay, shall provide for the defense of an insured in 
litigation in which any third party asserts a daim adverse to 
the title or interest as insured, but only as to those stated 
causes of action alleging a defect, lien or encumbrance or other 
matter insured against by this policy. The Company shall have 
the right to select counsel of its choice (subject to the right of 
the insured to object for reasonable cause) to represent the 
insured as to those stated causes of action and shall not be 
liable for and will not pay the fees of any other counsel The 
Company will not pay any fees, costs or expenses incurred by 
the insured hi the defense of those causes of action which 
allege matters not insured against by this policy. 
(b) The Company shall have the right, at its own cost, to 
institute and prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any 
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to 
establish the title to the estate or interest, as insured, or to pre-
vent or reduce toss or damaae to the insured. The Company 
may take any appropriate action under the terms of this poficy, 
whether or not it shall be liable hereunder, and shall not 
thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this poficy. 
If the Company shall exercise its rights under this paragraph, 
it shall do so diligently. 
(c) Whenever the Company shall have brought an 
action or interposed a defense as required or permitted by the 
provisions of this policy, the Company may pursue any litiga-
tion to final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction 
and expressly reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to 
appeal from any adverse judgment or order. 
(d) In all cases where this policy permits or requires the 
Company to prosecute or provide for the defense of any action 
or proceeding, the insured shall secure to the Company the 
right to so prosecute or provide defense in the action or pro-
ceeding, arid all appeals therein, and permit the Company to 
use, at its option, the name of the insured for this purpose. 
Whenever requested by the Company, the insured, at the Com-
pany's expense, shall give the Company all reasonable aid (i) 
m any action or proceedirta. securing evidence, obtaining wit-
nesses, prosecuting or defending the action or proceeding, or 
effecting settlement, and (ii) in any other lawful act which in 
the opinion of the Company may be necessary or desirable to 
establish the title to the estate or interest as insured. If the 
Company is prejudiced by the failure of the insured to furnish 
the required cooperation, the Company's obligations to the 
insured under the policy shall terminate, including any liability 
or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation, 
with regard to the matter a matters requiring such cooperation. 
5. PROOF OF LOSS OR OAMAGE. 
In addition to and after the notices required under Section 3 
of these Conditions and Stipulations have been provided the 
Company, a proof of toss or damage signed and sworn to by the 
insured claimant shall be furnished to the Company within 90 
days after the insured claimant shall ascertain the facts giving 
rise to the toss or damage. The proof of toss or damage shall 
describe the defect in, or lien or encumbrance on the title, or 
other matter insured against by this policy which constitutes 
lOf canccttduuu 
(b) ToPayorOtherwiseSetttoWmtPartiesOtherthan 
the Insured or With the Insured ClaimanL 
ffl topayorottierwisesetttewithotherpartiesftfor 
in the name of an insured claimant any claim Insured against 
under this policy, together with any costs, 8 0 0 0 1 ^ fees and 
expenses incurred by the insured claimant which were 
authorized by the Company up to the time of payment and 
which the Company is obligated to pay, or 
(IQ to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claim-
ant the loss or damage provided for under this poficy, tooether 
with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses tacurredoythe 
insured claimant which were authorized by theConipanyupto 
the time of payment and which the Company is obligated 
to pay. 
Upon the exercise by the Company of either of the options 
provided for in paragraphs (b)(i) or (ii), the Compan/s obfi-
gattons to the insured under this policy for the claimed toss or 
damage, other than the payments required to be made, shall 
terminate, including any liability or obligation to defend, pros-
ecute or continue any Gtigatioa 
7. DETERMINATION, EXTENT OF LIABILITY 
AND COINSURANCE 
This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual 
monetary toss or damage sustained or incurred by the insured 
claimant who has suffered toss or damage by reason of mat-
ters insured against by this poficy and only to the extent herein 
described. 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall 
not exceed the least ot 
fi) the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A; or, 
(ii) the difference between the value of the insured 
estate or interest as insured and the value of the insured 
estate or interest subject to the defect, lien or encumbrance 
insured against by this policy. 
(b) In the event the Amount of Insurance stated in 
Schedule A at the Oate of Policy is less than 80 percent of the 
value of the insured estate or interest or the full consideration 
paid for the land, whichever is less, or if subsequent to the Oate 
of Policy an improvement is erected on the land which in-
creases the value of the insured estate or interest by at least 
20 percent over the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, 
then this Policy is subject to the following: 
(0 where no subsequent improvement has been 
made, as to any partial toss, the Company shall only pay the 
toss pro rata in the proportion that the amount of insurance at 
Date of Poficy bears to the total value of the insured estate or 
interest at Date of Policy; or (ii) where a subsequent 
improvement has been made, as to any partial loss, the Com-
pany shall only pay the loss pro rata in the proportion that 120 
percent of the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A bears 
to the sum of the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A and 
the amount expended for the improvement 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to costs, 
attorneys' fees and expenses for which the Company is liable 
under this policy, and shall only apply to that portion of any 
toss which exceeds, in the aggregate, 10 percent of the 
Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A. 
(c) The Company will pay only thosecosts, attorneys' fees 
and expenses incurred in accordance with Section 4 of these 
Conditions and Stipulations. 
8. APPORTIONMENT. 
(f the land described in Schedule (A)(C) consists of two or 
more parcels which are not used as a single site, and a loss is 
established affecting one or more of the parcels but not all, the 
toss shall be computed and settled on a pro rata basis as if the 
amount of insurance under this policy was divided pro rata as 
to the value on Oate of Policy of each separate parcel to the 
whole, exclusive of any improvements made subsequent to 
Oate of Policy, unless a liability or value has otherwise been 
agreed upon as to each parcel by the Company and the insured 
at the time of the issuance of this policy and shown by an ex-
press statement or by an endorsement attached to this poficy. 
9. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. 
(a) If the Company establishes the title, or removes the 
alleged delect lien or encumbrance, or cures the lack ot a right 
of access to or from the land, or cures the claim of unmarket-
ability of title, all as insured, in a reasonably diligent manner by 
any method, including litigation and the completion of any 
appeals therefrom, it shall have fully performed its obligations 
with respect to that matter and shall not be liable for any toss 
or damage caused thereby 
jki.t 
insured c.„ 
promise or j™^, 
If toss shoOW tesutt from any act of trie Insured c&kiiant 
part of any losseslnsured against by this W ? w M shall 
e x c ^ t £ a m o w U a n y , l ^ 
^impairment by the insured claimant of the Company's 
right of subrogation. H ^ J (b) The Company's Rights Against non-insured 
Obligors. 
Tta[Gompamfc right of subrogation against noo-
insured obligors shall exist and Shan indude, without limita-
tion, the rights of the insured to indemnities, guaranties, 
other policies of insurance or bonds, notwithstanding any 
terms or conditions contained in those instruments which 
provide for subrogation rights by reason of this policy. 
14. ARBITRATION. 
Unless prohibited by applicable law, either the Company 
or the insured may demand arbitration pursuant to the Title 
Insurance Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association Arbitrable matters may include, but are no' 
limited to, any controversy or daim between the Company 
and the insured arising out of or relating to this policy, an\ 
service of the Company in connection with its issuance o 
the breach of a policy provision or other obligation. Al 
arbitrable matters when the Amount of Insurance i* 
$1.000.000 or less shall be arbitrated at the option of eithe 
the Company o( the insured. All arbitrable matters when ttv 
Amount of Insurance is in excess of $1,000,000 shall b 
arbitrated only when agreed to by both the Company and th 
insured Arbitration pursuant to this policy and under th 
Rules in effect on the date the demand for arbitration is mad 
or, at the option of the insured, the Rules in effect at Oate c 
Policy shall be binding upon the parties. The award ma 
include attorneys* fees only ft the laws of the state in whic 
the land is located permit a court to award attorneys' fees t 
a prevailing party. Judgment upon the award rendered by th 
Arbitrators) may be entered in any court having juris 
diction thereof. 
The law of the situs of the land shall apply to an arbitratic 
under the Title Insurance Arbitration Rules. 
A copy of the Rules may be obtained from the Compar 
upon request 
15. LIABILITY LIMITED TO THIS POLICY; 
POLICY ENTIRE CONTRACT. 
(a) This policy together with all endorsements, if an 
attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and co 
tract between the insured and the Company In interpret 
any provision of this policy, this policy shall be construed. 
a whole 
(bj Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not basi 
on negligence, and which arises out of the status of the tit 
to the estate or interest covered hereby or by any action a 
serting such daim, shall be restricted to this policy. 
(c) No amendment of or endorsement to this poll 
can be made except by a writing endorsed hereon 
attached hereto signed by either the President a Vice Pre 
dent the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or vafidati 
officer or authorized signatory of the Company. 
16. SEVERABILITY. 
In the event any provision of the policy is held invalid 
unenforceable under applicable law, the policy shall 
deemed not to indude that provision and all other provisic 
shall remain in full force and effect 
17. NOTICES, WHERE SENT. 
All notices required to be given the Company and i 
statement in writing required to be furnished the Compj 
shall include the number of this policy and shall 
addressed to the Company at 114 East Fifth Street Sa 
Ana, California 92701, or to the office which issued t 
policy. 
SCHEDULE A 
Total fee for Title Search, Examination 
and Title Insurance $200.00 
Amount of Insurance: $15,000.00 Policy No. 14549-15 
Date of Policy: 07/29/93 6 4*14 P.M. Order No. H-47763 
1. Name of Insured: 
DEAN R. POTTER and DIANE B. POTTER 
2. The estate or interest in the land which is covered by the policy is: 
FEE SIMPLE 
3. The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in: 
DEAN R. POTTER AND DIANE B. POTTER, his wife 
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, with full rights of 
survivorship. 
4. The land referred to in this policy is situated in the County of Box Elder, 
State of Utah, and is described as follows: 
05-060-0038 
BEGINNING at a point which lies South 89*51*47** West 476.48 feet along 
the Section line and South 0*35*46" West 50 feet from the Northeast 
Corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 
3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, said point of beginning lying on the South 
line of State Highway right of way and is also North 89*51*47" East 
163.94 feet from the Northeast Corner of Plat R, Tremonton City Survey, 
running thence South 0*35'46** West 178.00 feet; thence North 89*47*46" 
East 67 feet; thence North 178.00 feet to State Highway right of way 
line (said point also being the Northwest Corner of the Harris Truck and 
Equipment Inc. property); thence South 89*51*47** West 67 feet along 
State Highway right of way line to the point of BEGINNING. 
Reserving to the grantor a right of way for ingress and egress over the 
West 20 feet. 
SCHEDULE B 14549-15 
This policy does not Insure against loss by reason of the matters shown in parts 
one and two following: 
1. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies taxes or assessmer 
property or by the public records. 
2. Any facts, rights, interest, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by an inspect!( 
land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3. Easements, claims of easements, or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records. 
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments or any other facts which a correct survey would dii 
which are not shown by the public records. 
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in acts authorizing the issuance thereof, water rights, clalt 
to water. 
6. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material heretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law and not si 
public records. 
P a r t T w o ; 
1. Taxes for the year 1993 which are liens, but not yet due or payable. 
Taxes include the following: 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRCT, and 
BEAR RIVER WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRCT. 
Serial No. 05-060-0038. 
2. The described property is found within the corporate limits of Tremonton and is 
subject to all charges and assessments levied thereby. (Assessed with taxes) 
3. The described property is found within the boundaries of the 
Tremonton-Garland Drainage District and is subject to all assessments 
levied thereby. (Assessed with taxes) 
4. Subject to easement for pole lines and irrigation ditches as now 
existing over and across the property described herein. 
5. Subject to the reservation of all oil, gas and mineral rights. 
6. Subject to a right of way easement granted by Floyd Chadaz to 
Treraonton-Garland Drainage District recorded October 17, 1972 as Entry 
No. 32602H in Book 244 page 356 of the official records granting an 
easement over the following: COM at a pt 264 ft S of NE Cor of N-l/2 of 
NW- 1/4 of Sec 10, TUN, R3W, SLM, th S 1056 ft; th W 660 ft; th N 1287 
ft; th E 250 ft; th S 231 ft; th E 410 ft to BEG. ALSO: BEG at the SE 
Cor of the NW-1/4 of Sec 10, T11N, R 3 W, SLM, th W 650 ft, m/1, th N 
1320 ft; th E 650 ft; th S 1320 ft to pt of BEG. 
7. Subject to a ditch easement over the West 4 feet of the herein described 
property described and granted by instrument recorded March 17, 1981 as 
Entry No. 84037H in Book 343, Page 4 of the official records. 
8. Subject to an Agreement granted by J. L. Carter for Tremonton Garland 
Drainage District granting permanent construction rights above the 
underground drain line easement description as Item 6 above, said 
instrument recorded April 21, 1983 as Entry No. 97502H in Book 370, page 
153 of the official records. 
/ = 
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Addendum 10 
Marlin J. Grant (#4581) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH# IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
DEAN R. POTTER and 
DIANE B. POTTER, d/b/a 
DEAN'S SUPER LUBE 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DEAN R. POTTER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RETA CHADAZ (Party who claims 
66 foot Right-of-way); 
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C. 
BYWATER (On Warranty Deed); 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS. CO. 
(On Title Policy); 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, who may 
claim interest in said 
Right-of-way. 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 960000272 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Box Elder ) 
DEAN R. POTTER, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am competent to testify in this matter and am 
personally familiar with the facts of this case. 
2. Prior to the purchase of the property in question, I 
physically inspected the property. Upon physical inspection, I 
m 
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learned that the property dropped sharply off of Main Street and it 
was impossible for anyone to drive off of the curb from Main Street 
without high centering or dropping so sharp into the terrain as to 
make it impassable. Also, at the South end of the property a ditch 
runs East and West making it impossible to cross said property with 
vehicular traffic. I discovered that there had never been any use 
of the property for any right-of-way or roadways. 
3. Defendant Reta Chadaz claims that this right-of-way has 
been used as access to take farm machinery and equipment to and 
from Reta Chadaz property when the property had been farmed. I 
clearly deny this allegation based on the physical inspection, 
since the obstructions across the property would have made it 
impossible to take farm machinery or equipment through this 66 foot 
wide section and I am not aware of Defendant ever taking equipment 
across this property. 
4. Defendant Reta Chadaz also denies she ever was contacted 
by me. However, I affirmatively state that I called Reta Chadaz, 
as well as all other surrounding owners, including Fronk Chevrolet, 
Lucky's Restaurant, Mrs. Johnny Chadaz, and Bill Hatchf and 
indicated to all of them that I was going to build on the property 
and apply for a building permit, and that if they had any 
objections whatsoever to this construction of a building across 
said property, that they should appear at the zoning meeting to 
object. (See copy of zoning meeting minutes showing no 
objections.) Defendant Reta Chadaz stated by phone that it would 
make no difference anyway and failed to tell me that she claimed 
any right-of-way across the property. 
5. I specifically state that Maurice Staples never had a 
discussion with me until after I had already fully constructed all 
of the improvements on the property. This was several years after 
I had purchased the property. The date when Notice of Bona Fide 
purchaser status is to be construed is primarily on the date of 
purchase. I admit that I talked to Maurice Staples and was finally 
informed that someone was claiming a right-of-way across my 
property, but not until April of 1995, and I immediately went to 
) & 
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see my attorney on April 28, 1995, which was clearly after I had 
already constructed all of my improvements on the property. Both 
Reta Chadaz and Maurice Staples are totally in error to state that 
I had notice of the right-of-way prior to purchase or prior to 
building those improvements. 
6. Reta Chadaz has had several opportunities to tell me of 
her claim of right-of-way and has never made said claim until after 
April of 1995. 
7. I conducted a diligent search and inquiry into the 
property to make sure that it was free and clear. My bank insisted 
that before I build on the property that the property would have to 
be free of encumbrances. We conducted a title search which 
revealed that there were no encumbrances on the property and all 
the Deeds from Villatek forward reflect no evidence of any right-
of-way, several of which are granted by Warranty Deed. My 
immediate Seller, Gary Bywater, did not indicate that there was any 
right-of-ways across the property and no physical inspection 
revealed any right of way. When I personally contacted Reta 
Chadaz, she did not inform me of any right-of-way and no claim of 
right-of-way has ever been made by her prior to my purchase or 
while I was making improvements to my property. 
8. Reta Chadaz has several other access routes to her 
property including 100 South, 200 South, 400 South, 600 South and 
other City streets besides using my property. Those access routes 
are just as good, if not better, and are already built into the 
City's master plan for roadways. 
9. It seems totally unjust to harm an innocent purchaser, 
such as myself, when the party who could have stopped all of this 
failed to act. Reta Chadaz will not be harmed by taking alternative 
routes to her property whereas I will be severely damaged if a 
right-of-way is taken across the property I propose to expand my 
building on and where I have already made substantial improvements. 
The improvements made on the 66 foot piece of property in question 
cost me over $15,000.00 and include $8,257.00 on driveway 
improvements (see Misrasi Concrete bill); and about $7,000.00 on 
ibi 
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gravel fill, cement walls, lawn and sprinkler and other landscapinq 
improvements• I currently cannot improve my property further or 
obtain any other loans against my property until this right-of-way 
problem is cleared. 
10. I respectfully request the Court to rule the right-of-way 
to be abandoned, terminated and Reta Chadaz equitably estopped and 
to treat me as a bona fide purchaser for value taking the property 
free of said claim. 
DATED this ^/V^day of December, 1996. 
AY^O-ns^
 ts^y^t££^^> 
Dean R. Potter 
DEAN R. POTTER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says: That he has read the foregoing Affidavit, knows and 
i 
understands the contents thereof, and that the same are true of his 
own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and 
belief; and as to such matters, he believes them to be true. 
A^ 
Dean R. Potter 
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ADDENDUM 1 1 
FEES: 
BASE FEE: $10.00 
MAILING COSTS 
RECEIPT NUMBER 3077 
DATE PAID /,2-/-<73 
V.UWilXXJLUWiiX- «•="- * Addendum 11 
ZONING REVIEW 
(LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE CHAPTER 7-7) 
CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT NO, 
BUILDING PERMIT NO. (IF APPLICABLE). 
PROJECT REQUESTED: f% Lx. L\J&>J> C?wrW CL^-<L £J* 
DATE OF APPLICATION: 12M \^ 3 DATE OF MEETING: \l(l K_? 
REPRESENTED BY: X>* gr^ Vk ^V PHONE: 0<C1 Z/r7(f 
LOCATION OF REQUEST: Li)jp^ /^A*^ 
ACTION REQUESTED: f\ I A. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT: 
LIST ALL PROPERTY OWNERS THAT ARE WITHIN A 300 FOOT RADIUS OF THE 
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as0?' o^ ?^r 
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE NOTIFIED THOSE LISTED ABOVE OF THE DATE AND 
TIME OF THE MEETING WHERE MY APPLICATION WILL BE DISCUSSED- I 
UNDERSTAND THAT I AM SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY REPERCUSSIONS AS A 
RESULT OF MY FAILURE TO MAKE SAID NOTIFICATIONS. 
SIGNED: /U^c^^ ^y^^z 
PLANNING COMMISSION APPROVAL : H&^& Sr&rZ^ 
PLANNING COMMISSION CHAIRMAN 
CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT GRANTED (DATE) : <^« -? /?*? 
COMMENTS IN ADDITION TO MINUTES OF MEETING: 
rtOtfbJ 0 rvtfnUx - Juru 
NOTE: 
All required supporting data and fees must be received by noon the 
Friday prior to the Planning Commission meeting. 
BUS8COZ 
/<?c 
PLANNING COMMISSION AGENDA 
DECEMBER 7, 1993 
5:30 P.M. 
102 SOOTH TREMONT 
TREMONTON, DT 84337 
ITEM #1 - APPROVAL OF MINUTES 
ITEM #2 - APPROVAL OF AGENDA 
ITEM #3 - REZONING GIBBS REQUEST 
ITEM #4 - CONDITIONAL USE- WEST SIDE CHEVRON-NEW SIGN 
ITEM #5 - CONDITIONAL USE- HOME BUSINESS- SHARPENING SERVICE- BRUCE 
SNOOK- 771 S 540 W. 
ITEM #6 - CONDITIONAL USE- TAX ONE- INSIDE KENT'S THRIFTWAY 
ITEM #7 - CONDITIONAL USE- LUBE CENTER - DEAN POTTER- WEST MAIN 
ITEM #8 - CONDITIONAL USE - PERMISSION FOR PRE-FAB HOME ON CEMENT 
FOUNDATION- KEN FIRTH 
ITEM #9 - CONDITIONAL USE - HOME BUSINESS- K.B. DRAFTING- KELLY 
BENNETT- 682 S 634 W 
ITEM #10- FRANK KARNLEY PLAT AMENDMENT 
ITEM #11- CONDITIONAL USE REVIEW- MICHELLE HARPER- BAKING SPECIALTY 
IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO ATTEND THIS MEETING PLEASE CONTACT THE CITY 
OFFICE AT 257-3324. 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES NEEDING SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS MEETING SHOULD CONTACT SHARRI OYLER NO LATER 
THAN 48 HOURS PRIOR TO THE MEETING. 
NOTICE WAS POSTED DECEMBER 3, 1993 A DATE NOT LESS THAN 24 HOURS 
PRIOR TO THE DATE AND TIME OF THE MEETING AND REMAINED SO POSTED 
UNTIL AFTER SAID MEETING. A COPY OF THE AGENDA WAS DELIVERED TO 
THE LEADER (NEWSPAPER) ON DECEMBER 3, 1993. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN R. POTTER, to Reed W. Hadfield, MANN, 
HADFIELD & THORNE, Attorney for Defendant Reta Chadaz, 98 North 
Main, P.O. Box 876, Brigham City, Utah 84302, and Jeff R Thorne, 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE, Attorney for Defendants Gary Bywater and 
Karleen C. Bywater, at 98 North Main, P.O. Box 876{ Brigham City, 
Utah 84302, postage prepaid, this ^ day of 
/ U # XJ J . JL Vj XXCU 
. -Geceuuj^ir > 1 9 9 6 . 
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PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING 
DECEMBER 7, 1993 
MEMBERS PRESENT: 
MAX WEESE PEGGY HOFFMAN 
GERALD SMITH DON MEYER 
CAROL TURLEY RICH WOODWORTH, CITY MANAGER 
STEVE JENSEN SHARRI OYLER, SECRETARY 
STAN STOKES 
ITEM #1 - Motion made by Gerald Smith of accept the minutes of the 
November 16 meeting and the December 2 meeting. Second by Don 
Meyer* All approved. 
ITEM #2 - Motion made by Max Weese to accept the agenda with the 
addition of #12 - Mr. Canfield plat amendment and #13 - York Coburn 
request for a mobile office unit at Tremonton Lumber• Second by 
Gerald Smith. All approved. 
ITEM #3 - Gibbs rezoning request - Request for two homes and a 
business on there property on 1000 North. They request that the 
two homes be connected with a sun room. In a R 1 20 zone no 
business is allowed and only single housing is allowed. The 
commission can't spot zone to allow this. The homes can't be 
hooked together, there must be 20 feet between the edge of the roof 
and the two homes. They must comply with the side yard 
requirements. Carports with no obstacles blocking the way# just an 
open carportf can be one foot inside the property line. A garage 
can be 10 feet inside the property line. This is for fire safety 
requirements. The two separate homes would each require their own 
septic tank, and two separate water lines must be ran, one for each 
home. This property is divided as a minor subdivision so it would 
be easy to replat. A survey is required to show they are two 
separate taxable properties. There is no problem with storing 
equipment in the building, but no business is allowed to be 
conducted on the property. A office may be located in the 
building, but no work can be conducted in the building. 
ITEM #4 - Westside Chevron requesting a new sign. They will be 
relocating the existing sign, from the front of the building to the 
side. It will be higher than the Greenline Equipment sign, so 
neither sign would be obstructing the other. They will take the 
one sign down the same time the new on is put up. Motion made by 
Gerald Smith the grant the conditional use for the new position of 
the sign, with a 6 month review. Second by Stan Stokes. All 
approved. 
ITEM #5 - Conditional Use request by Bruce Snook for a sharpening 
service. He would be sharpening saws, blades, knifes, etc* He 
will be doing this in a shed, there will be very little noise. He 
has notified his neighbors. No signs of advertisement should be 
posted and no inventory can be stored there. Motion by Steve 
Jensen to grant the Conditional Use with a review in 6 months* 
Second by Peggy Hoffman. All approved* 
ITEM #6 - Conditional Use request for Tax One office inside Kent's 
Thriftway* They would be located inside Kent's by the bakery. 
They will only be there during the tax season, from January through 
April 15th* There will be one person working at all times and on 
occasion 2. They will be doing tax preparing, electronic filing 
and answering questions* They will be paying Kent's on a 
percentage basis* 
This would be a business inside a business* There are several 
others in the city. Stan Stokes made the motion to grant the 
Conditional Use for Tax One with a review in 6 months* Second by 
Max Weese* All approved* 
ITEM #7 - Conditional Use request for a center. They will 
have two bays, it will be only for regular automotive cars and 
trucks, not for semi's. Not much parking is required, they will be 
done with a vehicle in 15 minutes. He has purchased the property 
from Fronk's to Lucky's. The building is 20 ft X 42 ft. The sewer 
is located at the back of the lot, the water is in the front. All 
signs will comply with the ordinance* Will be starting in March. 
Don Meyer made the motion to accept the plan, must meet all EPA, 
health, fire and engineer requirements with satisfactory black top, 
with a review in 6 months. Second by Steve Jensen. All approved. 
ITEM #8 - Ken Firth request for a pre-fah home on a cement 
foundation. The home meets all Hud standards, it is a new unit. 
It will be on a cement basement foundation, with walk out access. 
They do have approval for a septic tank. Carol Turley made the 
motion to accept the plan as stated* Second by Max Weese. All 
approved. 
ITEM #9 - Conditional Use for a home business. This 
is done in a room in the basement of the home. All the work is 
done on computer. Neighbors have been notified. It is not allowed 
to advertise or have any inventory. Gerald Smith made the motion 
to grant the Conditional Use with a review in 6 months. Second by 
Peggy Hoffman. All approved. 
ITEM #10 - Steve Jensen excused himself from the board for this 
issue concerning a conflict of interest. Gerald Smith conducted. 
Frank Karnely plat amendment- to change the existing plat from 
three one acre lots to 4 one acre lots. They will be 255 ft deep 
X 170 feet wide. This was divided as a minor subdivision, a survey 
is required. Stan Stokes made the motion to accept the plat 
change. Second by Don Meyer. All approved. Steve Jensen 
abstained. 
ITEM #11 - Conditional Use review for Michelle Harper, baking 
specialty cookies. No complaints have been made. Steve Jensen 
made the motion to grant the Conditional Use indefinitely/ 
requesting I find out if it is still in operation. Second by 
Gerald Smith. All approved. 
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learned that the property dropped sharply off of Main Street and it 
was impossible for anyone to drive off of the curb from Main Street 
without high centering or dropping so sharp into the terrain as to 
make it impassable. Also, at the South end of the property a ditch 
runs East and West making it impossible to cross said property with 
vehicular traffic. I discovered that there had never been any use 
of the property for any right-of-way or roadways. 
3. Defendant Reta Chadaz claims that this right-of-way has 
been used as access to take farm machinery and equipment to and 
from Reta Chadaz property when the property had been farmed. I 
clearly deny this allegation based on the physical inspection, 
since the obstructions across the property would have made it 
impossible to take farm machinery or equipment through this 66 foot 
wide section and I am not aware of Defendant ever taking equipment 
across this property. 
4. Defendant Reta Chadaz also denies she ever was contacted 
by me. However, I affirmatively state that I called Reta Chadaz, 
as well as all other surrounding owners, including Fronk Chevrolet, 
Lucky's Restaurant, Mrs. Johnny Chadaz, and Bill Hatch, and 
indicated to all of them that I was going to build on the property 
and apply for a building permit, and that if they had any 
objections whatsoever to this construction of a building across 
said property, that they should appear at the zoning meeting to 
object. (See copy of zoning meeting minutes showing no 
objections.) Defendant Reta Chadaz stated by phone that it would 
make no difference anyway and failed to tell me that she claimed 
any right-of-way across the property. 
5. I specifically state that Maurice Staples never had a 
discussion with me until after I had already fully constructed all 
of the improvements on the property. This was several years after 
I had purchased the property. The date when Notice of Bona Fide 
purchaser status is to be construed is primarily on the date of 
purchase. I admit that I talked to Maurice Staples and was finally 
informed that someone was claiming a right-of-way across my 
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne, #1289 
Attorneys for Defendant Reta Chadaz 
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN R. POTTER and ] 




RETA CHADAZ (Party who claims ] 
66 foot Right-of-Way 
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN 
BYWATER (On Warranty Deed); 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS. CO. ' 
(On Title Policy); 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, who may 
claim an interest in said 
Right-of-Way. 
Defendants. 
( AFFIDAVIT OF MAURICE STAPLES 
) Civil No. 960000272 QT 
) Judge: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER ) 
Maurice Staples being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. Sometime after the purchase by the plaintiffs of the 
property set forth in plaintiff's Complaint in the above-entitled 
matter, this affiant and the plaintiff, Dean Potter, were 
discussing the subject of the property Dean Potter had purchased 
upon which to build his business. This discussion took place at 
the Cross Roads Cafe in Tremonton, Utah, 
2. Reta Chadaz nka Reta Hodson prior to this time had 
advised this affiant that she had a right of way across this 
property to her approximately 35 acres of farm land to the south of 
said right of way. This affiant had leased this property from Reta 
Chadaz and had paid her rent for said property* 
3. When this affiant advised Dean Potter that Reta Chadaz 
claimed an interest in the 66 foot right of way, Dean Potter 
requested this affiant to furnish him a copy of documentation 
showing this to be the fact. 
4. This affiant obtained from Reta Chadaz a copy of an 
Agreement (see Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A) and took 
said Agreement and showed it to Dean Potter. Dean Potter requested 
that he be allowed to make a copy of said Agreement and this 
permission was given. This affiant picked up the copy he had taken 
to Dean Potter later that same day. The only improvements that had 
been made upon the property disputed in this lawsuit were a fence 
had been removed and some gravel had been placed on said property. 
5. The plaintiff, Dean Potter, advised this affiant that if 
Reta Chadaz had a right of way through this property, that Bywater 
would have to refund to Dean Potter the money he had paid for such 
property, and that at such time as the road was put in, he would 
use it for an entrance to his property. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this / -^  day of / Ast/. 1996. 
ADDENDUM 14 
A d d e n d u m 1 4 
ft^* LuftmAdais, Box Elder County Recorder 
r ) 1 / V > 10/08/19% 4:25p. FEE- 12.00 Dep 
" I ' Rec'd F o r : MfiNN KfflFIELD t THORNE 
** ^ - ^ ^ QUIT CLAIM DEED-
HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, INC., a Utah Corporation, GRANTOR 
of Kaysville, County of Davis, State of Utah 
hereby QUIT CLAIMS to RETA CHADAZ, GRANTEE 
for the sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars and other valuable 
consideration in and to the following described tract 
of land situate in Box Elder County, State of Utah, 
to-wit: 
A right of way over the East 66 feet of the following 
described property for the purpose of a proposed road: 
Part of the Northwest quarter of Section "10, Township 
11 North, Range 3 West, SLB&M: 
Beginning at a point on the South line of the highway 
right-of-way which is located South 89*51/47M West 
637.42 feet along the section line and South 0*35'46" 
West 50.00 feet from the Northeast corner of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, 
Range 3 West, SLB&M; point of beginning also being 
located North 89°51'47" East 3.00 feet from the 
Northeast corner of Plat R, Tremonton City Survey, 
thence South 0#35'46" West 300.05 feet, thence North 
89*47'46" East 231.06 feet, thence North 299.75 feet to 
the South highway right-of-way line (point also being 
the Northwest corner of the Harris Truck and Equipment, 
Inc. property), thence South 89°51'47" West 227.94 feet 
along said South highway right-of-way line to the point 
of beginning. Contains 1.58 acres. 
It is the intent of the conveyance to transfer to the 
Grantee all of the interest designated as "SUBJECT TO A 
RIGHT-OF-WAY OVER THE EAST 66 FEET OF SAID PROPERTY, 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF A PROPOSED ROAD" as set forth in 
that Special Warranty Deed recorded in Book^23iPpages 
680 and 681 of the Official Records of the Box Elder 
County Recorder's Office in Box Elder County, Utah. 
ADDENDUM 15 
Addend vim 15 
File Telephone Utility Settings Help 00:02:30 | C N E P S | CONNECT 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
CORPORATIONS DATA SHARE 
ENTER NAME HERITAGE PARK 
ENTER THE NAME OF THE ENTITY YOU ARE SEARCHING 
FOR AND THEN HIT THE RETURN KEY 
HIT CTRL "B" KEY TO RETURN TO THE CORPORATION MENU 
File Telephone Utility Settings Help 00:02:44 | C N E P S | CONNECT 
NM TP NUMBER ENTITY NAME ST-DATE ST 
HERITAGE PARK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION 
HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, INC. 
HERITAGE PARK TOWNHOUSE ASSOCIATION 
HERITAGE PARK, L.C. 
HERITAGE PARLOUR 
HERITAGE PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS, INC. 
HERITAGE PHONES 
HERITAGE PHOTOGRAPHY 
HERITAGE PICTURES, INC. 
HERITAGE PLACE ASSISTED LIVING 
HERITAGE PLANNERS, INC. 
HERITAGE PLANNING CONSULTANTS, INC. 
HERITAGE PLUMBING 
HERITAGE PLUMBING SERVICES, INC. 
HERITAGE PRESERVATION AND RECYCLING INC. 
HERITAGE PRESERVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION 
HERITAGE PRESS PUBLISHING CO. 
HERITAGE PRODUCTION, INC. 
HERITAGE PRODUCTIONS 
HERITAGE PRODUCTIONS, INC. 
SELECT NUMBER HIT "RETURN" TO SEE MORE; CTRL "B" TO GO BACK 
File Telephone Utility Settings Help 00:02:52 | C N E P S | CONNECT 
07/09/98 UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS & COMMERCIAL CODE 14:14:48 
••CORPORATION INFORMATION - SCREEN 1** 
STATUS: INVOLUNTARILY DISSOLVED 03/31/83-FAILURE TO PAY TAXES 
NAME IN HOME STATE: 
PRINCIPAL ADDRESS: 
INCORPORATED/QUALIFIED: 09/11/1980 
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